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ARTICLES
PUBLIC-PRIVATE CONTRACTING AND THE
RECIPROCITY NORM
WENDY NETTER EPSTEIN*
When governments outsource work to private entities—running prisons and
schools, administering state benefits, and the like—they tend to write extremely
detailed contracts. The conventional thinking is that these private entities
need to be constrained lest they act opportunistically. Therefore, governments
write contracts that highly specify tasks, contain robust monitoring provisions,
and financially reward task compliance. This detailed contracting approach,
viewing agents as selfish, profit-driven, and looking for opportunities to shirk,
finds support in both the agency cost and public law literatures.
This Article challenges the prevailing approach. It argues that controlbased contracts can be not only difficult and expensive to write and costly to
monitor, but they can stifle intrinsic motivation and innovation. Such
detailed contracts frequently fail in practice with serious negative implications
for the public.
Recent literature in behavioral economics suggests that the conventional
approach is actually premised on a misunderstanding of human
nature. Experiments on the positive reciprocity norm—meaning that people
reward kind actions—have shown that less complete contracts induce higher
effort levels and a more cooperative principal-agent relationship than the
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Helveston, Michael Jacobs, Bob Lawless, Jonathan Masur, Martha Minow, Eric Rasmussen, Zoe Robinson, Christopher Schmidt, Alan Schwartz, Carolyn Shapiro, Tom
Ulen, Melissa Wasserman, and Verity Winship for comments and advice on this paper
and Elizabeth McErlean and Nicole Mirjanich for research assistance. I am also
grateful to the attendees of the University of Chicago Legal Scholars Workshop, the
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traditional approach. This Article incorporates this behavioral research and
studies of real world behavior to present an interdisciplinary argument for why
the traditional public-private contracting approach should be rethought, both
in theory and in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
After the Navy discharged Aaron Alexis, a petty officer third class
with a checkered performance record, he found work with a military
contractor.1 His job gave him access to sensitive military installations
across the world.2 On September 16, 2013, he used that access to kill
twelve people at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., less than two
miles from the Capitol.3
1. Sari Horwitz et al., Navy Yard Gunman Had History of Mental Illness, Checkered
Military Career, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/alleged-navy-yard-gunman-had-checkered-military-career-officials-say/
2013/09/17/a136ad0c-1fa1-11e3-8459-657e0c72fec8_story.html.
2. Id.
3. Peter Hermann & Ann E. Marimow, Navy Yard Shooter Aaron Alexis Driven by
Delusions, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
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Edward Snowden, a high school drop-out turned computer whiz,
parlayed a job as a security guard for the National Security Agency
into information technology work at the Central Intelligence Agency.4
After a couple of years, he left the CIA to become a subcontractor for
the NSA.5 In May 2013, Snowden intentionally disclosed classified
details of government surveillance programs to the press, creating
tensions between the United States and some of its closest allies.6 He
was subsequently charged with various acts of espionage.7
Alexis and Snowden have one surprising thing in common. They
were both vetted by U.S. Investigative Services, Inc. (“USIS”), a
private company the U.S. government contracted with to conduct
background checks after the government had amassed an untenable
backlog for top secret security clearances.8 By outsourcing to USIS in
a $2.45 billion, five-year contract, the government hoped to harness
crime/fbi-police-detail-shooting-navy-yard-shooting/2013/09/25/ee321abe-260011e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html.
4. Farhad Manjoo, If the NSA Trusted Edward Snowden with Our Data, Why Should
We Trust the NSA?, SLATE (June 9, 2013, 7:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/future_tense/2013/06/09/edward_snowden_why_did_the_nsa_whistleblower
_have_access_to_prism_and_other.html; Eric Schmitt, C.I.A. Warning on Snowden in
‘09 Said to Slip Through the Cracks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/10/11/us/cia-warning-on-snowden-in-09-said-to-slip-through-the-cracks.html?_r=0.
5. See Schmitt, supra note 4.
6. Ellen Nakashima, Officials Alert Foreign Services that Snowden Has Documents on
Their Cooperation with U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/officials-alert-foreign-services-that-snowden-hasdocuments-on-their-cooperation-with-us/2013/10/24/930ea85c-3b3e-11e3-a94fb58017bfee6c_story.html.
7. Id.; see also Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage,
WASH. POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/us-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a01692547bf094cc_story.html (detailing charges brought including two counts under the
1917 Espionage Act); Schmitt, supra note 4.
8. See Trip Gabriel, Shortcuts Seen by Firm Doing Security Checks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/us/pressure-reported-in-rush-tomeet-security-clearances-including-edward-snowden-and-aaron-alexis.html
[hereinafter Gabriel, Shortcuts] (explaining that government investigations for top
secret level security clearances may take as long as 400 days, requiring the
government to outsource to meet post-2001 demand for top secret cleared
personnel); Dion Nissenbaum, Bottom Line Drove Security Clearances at USIS: Company
Rushed Investigations to Meet Targets, Former Employees Say, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230433090457913744332669
4158 (discussing USIS’s financial incentive to quickly process background checks);
Jia Lynn Yang, Security-Clearance Contractor USIS’s Workers Felt Pressure to Do More and
Faster, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-20/
business/42252868_1_usis-background-checks-edward-snowden (finding that many
USIS employees felt pressured to perform their interviews quickly, not thoroughly).
Alexis had a history of mental illness and previous gun-related charges, but USIS
reported none of these details in its security clearance investigations. Trip Gabriel et
al., Suspect’s Past Fell Just Short of Raising Alarm, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/09/18/us/washington-navy-yard-shootings.html. Snowden had
previously been suspected of trying to hack into classified computer files while
working for the CIA. See Schmitt, supra note 4.
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the speed, efficiency, and innovation of the private sector. To
incentivize such efficiency, USIS was entitled to payment only when it
completed investigations.9
USIS succeeded in eliminating the backlog on security checks. But
it did so in a way the government presumably did not intend.10 To
meet revenue goals, particularly at month end, senior executives at
USIS allegedly gave the directive to flush applications—simply
approving them without review—so that the company could receive
payment.11 In other words, USIS took shortcuts to accomplish socalled efficient results.12
The USIS example is not an isolated one. Recent years have seen a
government privatization frenzy fueled by faith that the private sector
can outperform the government by reducing costs while improving
service quality.13 But evidence is mounting that at least for certain
types of services, governments are not seeing the predicted
improvement in quality through outsourcing.14 Rather than reducing
9. See Gabriel, Shortcuts, supra note 8; see also S. REP. NO. 113-257, at 3–4 (2014)
(reporting on a Department of Justice investigation that revealed that USIS
submitted incomplete background checks in order to increase its revenues).
10. See id. (describing that USIS had adopted a revenue-driven rather than
quality driven work model); see also Safeguarding Our Nation’s Secrets: Examining the
Security Clearance Process: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Efficiency &
Effectiveness of Fed. Programs & the Fed. Workforce and Subcomm. on Fin. & Contracting
Oversight of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 7–8, 32–
34 (2013) (statement of Patrick McFarland, Inspector Gen. for U.S. Office of
Personnel Management).
11. Gabriel, Shortcuts, supra note 8.
12. Christian Davenport, USIS Contracts for Federal Background Security Checks Won’t
Be Renewed, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/opm-to-end-usis-contracts-for-background-securitychecks/2014/09/09/4fcd490a-3880-11e4-9c9f-ebb47272e40e_story.html
(announcing, due in part to these issues, that the Office of Personnel Management
would not renew any of its USIS contracts).
13. See, e.g., Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private
Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2214 (2013) [hereinafter Epstein, Contract
Theory] (private contractors are perceived to be more efficient and cost effective than
government agencies); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023,
1025 (2013) (denoting the pervasive scope of modern day government contracting);
GRANT THORNTON, THE STATE OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR INDUSTRY: 2010 1
(2010), available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Government%20
contractors/Government%20contractor%20files/GovConRdtble2010FINALpdf.pdf
(noting the growth rate of government contracting industry despite the economic
downturn in other sectors).
14. See infra Part II (describing the spectrum of government service contracting
and types of services most likely to have high agency costs); see also John D. Donahue,
The Transformation of Government Work: Causes, Consequences, and Distortions, in
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 41, 48 (2009)
(suggesting that certain categories of services do poorly when privatized); David M. Van
Slyke, The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
296, 307–08 (2003) [hereinafter Van Slyke, Mythology of Privatization]; Jean Beuve &
Lisa Chever, Quality of Outsourced Services, Rent-Seeking and Contract Design. Evidence
from Cleaning Contracts 2 (Chaire Economie des Partenariats Public Privé Institut
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cost and improving service through innovation, private providers
often reduce cost by cutting corners.15 This is the USIS story, but it is
also the story of the company that ran a private halfway house that
chose to reduce security to save money, a factor that contributed to
inmate escapes.16 It is also the story of the private provider of state
welfare services that allegedly skimped on personnel and made
mistakes in coverage decisions, leaving needy applicants without
crucial benefits.17
This problem is well theorized by commentators as a principalagent problem.18 The interests of the government, as principal, do
d’Administration des Enterprises, Discussion Paper No. 2014-04, 2014), available at
http://chaire-eppp.org/files_chaire/beuvechevermars2014_1.pdf (“postulating that the
cost savings of outsourcing “might be achieved at the expense of quality”).
15. See, e.g., supra notes 8, 10 and accompanying text (explaining how the
increased revenue goal led to a decrease in quality of services in the USIS contract).
16. See Sam Dolnick, At A Halfway House, Bedlam Reigns, N.Y. TIMES (June 17,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/nyregion/at-bo-robinson-a-halfwayhouse-in-new-jersey-bedlam-reigns.html?_r=1&smid=fb-share (describing how the
private organization falsified inmate records to reflect that the inmates were
receiving therapy and other services at the halfway house).
17. See Bowman v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 853 F. Supp. 2d 766, 768 (S.D. Ind.
2012) (referencing the complaint, which alleged that the private contractor was
negligent in its contractual obligations and failed to properly process the plaintiffs’
Medicaid claims); Privatization Myths Debunked, IN PUB. INT., http://www.
inthepublicinterest.org/node/457 (last visited August 25, 2014) (listing several areas
where privatization proved costlier and more inefficient than government led
projects); see also Mike Brickner, States Should Run Screaming From the CCA to Avoid
Dangerous and Disgusting Prisons, ACLU OF OHIO (Feb. 4, 2013, 12:11 PM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/states-should-run-screaming-cca-avoiddangerous-and-disgusting-prisons (detailing the numerous violations and problems
at a privately run prison); Donald Cohen, Edward Snowden and the Disaster of
Privatization, REUTERS (July 11, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/
07/11/edward-snowden-and-the-disaster-of-privatization/; Maria Dinzeo, $50 Million
Computer Fiasco in Sacramento, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 25, 2013, 9:59 AM),
http://www.courthousenews.com/2013/11/25/63190.htm (detailing the failed
attempt at privatizing the statewide payroll system in California); Michael D. Shear &
Annie Lowrey, In Tech Buying, U.S. Still Stuck in Last Century, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/23/us/politics/in-tech-buying-us-still-stuckin-last-century.html?_r=1& (explaining the government’s repeated failures at
awarding successful technology contracts).
18. See, e.g., Catherine Donnelly, Privatization and Welfare: A Comparative
Perspective, 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 336, 346 (2011) (recognizing that government
outsourcing leads to a reversal of power in the principal-agent paradigm, giving the
agent more power than the principal); Michaels, supra note 13, at 1027 (noting that
privatization proponents look for ways to “align principal-agent incentives”); see also
Mary S. Logan, Using Agency Theory to Design Successful Outsourcing Relationships, 11
INT’L J. LOGISTICS MGMT. 21, 22 (2000) (exploring principal-agent power disparities
through the lens of transportation outsourcing); Barbara S. Romzek & Jocelyn M.
Johnston, State Social Services Contracting: Exploring the Determinants of Effective Contract
Accountability, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 436, 438 (2005) (explaining that the traditional
principal-agent relationship in government contracts is not well suited for contracts
in the social service sector); E.S. Savas, Privatization in State and Local Government, in
RESTRUCTURING STATE AND LOCAL SERVICES: IDEAS, PROPOSALS, AND EXPERIMENTS 91,
99 (1998) (advocating for privatization because of its ability to increase savings
without cutting services).
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not align with the interests of the private provider, as agent.19 The
private service provider seeks to increase profit by decreasing costs.20
The government, at least in the most flattering view, is motivated to
provide high quality service to its constituents.21 The way to solve this
problem according to the prevailing literature is for the government
to use the same approach to mitigating agency costs as contracting
parties do in other contexts—write better contracts.22 “Better”
contracts are ones that highly specify tasks and financially reward
compliance with those tasks—so-called incentive-based contracting.23
This approach assumes that rational, selfish actors are looking for
opportunities to shirk.
This Article challenges both the assumptions and the approach.
While the traditional method may work well where tasks are easy to
define and monitor and where there is a thick market with switching
options, often when the government now outsources, such conditions
are not present. In addition, control-based contracts are not only difficult
and expensive to write and costly to monitor, but they risk stifling

19. Donnelly, supra note 18, at 346.
20. Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2218.
21. See id. at 2216 (suggesting that the government may not always have an
adequate incentive to provide quality service, especially to the disenfranchised, but
assuming that governments would rather provide high quality service than low
quality service when contracting out).
22. See, e.g., Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1348
(2012); see also H. EDWARD WESEMANN, CONTRACTING FOR CITY SERVICES 61–62 (1981)
(listing provisions which may be mutually agreed upon within a city services
contract); Trevor L. Brown et al., Managing Public Service Contracts: Aligning Values,
Institutions, and Markets, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 323, 327 (2006) (describing the areas in
which the principal has the ability to fine tune contract specifications); Nestor M.
Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare: The Case of Housing,
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 263 (2006) (“Commentators concerned with capturing
privatization’s benefits and muting its potential harms often call for additional
government control of private providers through their contractual agreements,
specifying in ever-more-careful terms the scope of the engagement and monitoring
providers with ever-greater oversight.”); Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1887 (2002) [hereinafter The Law of Prisons] (arguing that
clarity is essential in developing a sound performance contract); Lisa A. Dicke,
Ensuring Accountability in Human Services Contracting: Can Stewardship Theory Fill the
Bill?, 32 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 455, 465–66 (2002) (pointing out that government
officials try to ensure quality contracting employees through strict contractual
provisions); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 170–71
(2000) (suggesting that “[c]ontracts could specify tasks more clearly, [and] detail
procedures more thoroughly”); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1267 (2003) (discussing
contractual mechanisms for ensuring accountability to public values in the context of
privatization); Romzek & Johnston, supra note 18, at 438 (finding that contractual
language could alleviate many problems faced by public service government contracts).
23. See Minow, supra note 22, at 1262–63 (discussing the benefits and challenges
of using this model in the social services context).
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intrinsic motivation and innovation.24 Such detailed contracts frequently
fail in practice, with serious negative implications for the public.25
This Article argues that where the traditional method does not
work and a contractor performs a control-based contract poorly,
governments should try the opposite and write less-detailed
contracts.26 Although less-specified contracts may seem counterintuitive, a growing literature in behavioral economics on reciprocity
supports this method.27 People reward kind actions but view controlbased contracts attempting to micromanage agent behavior as
unkind. How an agent perceives the kindness inherent in a contract
affects the agent’s performance under the contract.28 Although this
Article focuses on the government outsourcing example, a reciprocitybased approach to contracting may be even more widely applicable.29
There is now a robust experimental literature that assesses how
reciprocity functions in a variety of simulated settings.30 The seminal
works in this area were either completed by or inspired by Ernst

24. See, e.g., Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement,
Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 132 (2001) (noting that for
intellectually honest parties to a contract, strict contractual construction can be
overly restrictive); Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL.
627, 659 (1999) [hereinafter Deci et al., Extrinsic Rewards] (positing that rewards are
not an effective substitute for intrinsic motivation); Eileen Chou et al., The ControlMotivation Dilemma:
Contract Specificity Undermines Intrinsic Motivation,
Persistence, and Creativity 3–4 (2014) (under review at Organization Science) (on file
with author) (demonstrating through experiment that less-specific contracts prompt
intrinsic motivation in the employment context).
25. See infra Part I.D; see also Praxis Solutions, Inc., Government Contracting and
Competition—Another Principal-Agent Problem, 1 PRAXIS SERIES, no. IV, 2002, at 1, 4,
available at http://www.praxisolutions.com/PrincipalAgent.pdf. See generally PHILLIP
J. COOPER, GOVERNING BY CONTRACT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC
MANAGERS (2003).
26. See infra Part III.B.
27. See supra note 24.
28. See infra Part III.A–B; see also Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and
Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 170 (2000)
[hereinafter Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation]; Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a
Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 833 (1997)
[hereinafter Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device] (discussing
experimental evidence tending to show that people reciprocate fair or unfair
treatment in kind and applying to contract context); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of SelfEnforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1663 (2003) (discussing the
Ultimatum Game, which revealed social preferences other than self-interest in the
bargaining context).
29. This Article focuses on public-private contracting because its common
characteristics make control-based contracts a particularly poor fit. Therefore, it is
worth addressing public-private contracts first.
30. See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1447 (2010)
[hereinafter Gilson et al., Braiding] (collecting work).
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Fehr.31 He found that in the contract context specifically, the
inclination towards reciprocity translates into less complete contracts
that induce a greater level of effort from agents than one would
rationally anticipate.32 Other studies have confirmed similar results.33
Findings in the regulatory context also support a less-detailed
contracting approach, where real-world experiences launched a move
away from command and control regulation toward a more flexible,
standards-based regime.34
This Article does not suggest that contracts should be completely
devoid of content or direction. All contracts exist on a spectrum of
completeness.35 This Article does not intend to precisely identify
where on the spectrum of completeness government service contracts
should exist. Rather, it suggests that the majority of contracts are too
detailed and too complete, and that contracts should leave more
discretion to the agent, fostering the agent’s sense of intrinsic

31. See, e.g., Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device, supra note 28, at
834 (finding that reciprocity is supported by scientific study); Fehr & Gächter,
Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 159 (finding that economic analysis supports
the theory that human beings are inclined to fairness and are not solely self-motivated).
32. Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device, supra note 28, at 834.
33. See, e.g., Bohnet et al., supra note 24, at 131–51 (finding incentive contracts
decrease cooperation); Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory: A
Survey of Empirical Evidence, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 589–612 (2001) (suggesting that
monetary incentives are not as effective as reciprocity arrangements for providing
motivation); Judd B. Kessler & Stephen Leider, Norms and Contracting, 58 MGMT. SCI.
62, 62 (2012) (discussing experiment finding unenforceable “handshake
agreements” to be most effective); Mark Lubell & John T. Scholz, Cooperation,
Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 160, 175–76 (2001)
(finding that the use of incentives can crowd out reciprocity); Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation? 13–14 (Inst. for
Empirical Research in Econ., Discussion Paper No. 3017, 2000) [hereinafter Fehr &
Gächter, Crowd Out] (reporting that the incentive contract may not be better than
the pure trust contract); Chou et al., supra note 24, at 2–4 (demonstrating the
crowding out effect of specified contracts in employment contract setting); see also
Scott, supra note 28, at 1644–45 (showing that experimental study results may predict
“deliberately incomplete agreements between strangers is more efficient than the
alternative of more complete, legally enforceable contracts). But see Mary Rigdon,
Trust and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting 18 (Nat’l Sci. Found., Working Paper,
2006) (finding no evidence that incentives “crowd out” social norms).
34. Cf., JOHN MIKLER, GREENING THE CAR INDUSTRY: VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM AND
CLIMATE CHANGE 72–73 (2009) (Japanese car industry motivated by internal sources,
not detailed regulation); John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal
Certainty, 27 AUSTL. J. L. PHIL. 47, 68 (2002) (exploring a study of the role of
regulations in the British finance industry, and identifying a trend away from binding
rules and towards broad principles).
35. See, e.g., Trevor L. Brown et al., Contracting for Complex Products, 20 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY i41, i43 (2010) (“Contract completeness is the degree to which
the contract defines buyers’ and sellers’ rights and obligations across all future
contingencies.”); Scott, supra note 28, at 1641–42 (explaining that all contracts are
incomplete to some degree).
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motivation.36 While contracts cannot be silent about goals or desired
outcomes, they also should not dictate precisely what steps be taken
to achieve those goals or desired outcomes.
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I describes in principalagent terms how government service contracting in certain contexts
results in cost cutting but fails to improve service quality. It then
explores current scholarship suggesting mechanisms to solve the
problem through detailed contracting. There has been significant
discourse on this issue in both the public law literature and amongst
economists who write about best practices in contracting.
Part II explains why the solution that theory predicts to mitigate
agency costs (control-based contracting) does not work well in
certain contexts. The discussion sets out a multi-dimensional
spectrum and suggests that when governments contract out services
(1) for which the provider market is thin, (2) where tasks are
complex and difficult to specify, and (3) where effective monitoring
is elusive, the detailed contracting approach is biased to be ineffective.
Part III sets out the alternative proposal. Where writing highly
detailed contracts is not optimal, there is another option. Part III
explores the experimental literature on positive reciprocity in
contracting. It suggests there is reason to be optimistic about the
potential for less detailed contracting and parties’ abilities to rely on
the reciprocity norm as a contract enforcement device. Although this
research is very promising, and an analogy to the regulatory context
provides real-world examples, work in this area is still preliminary.
Accordingly, Part III also discusses this approach’s potential limitations
and offers suggestions for further study. Ultimately, Part III leaves
open the possibility that reciprocity-based contracting might have
even broader application outside the government outsourcing context.
I.

PRIVATIZATION FAILURES AND THE CURRENT
CONTRACTING APPROACH

Widespread budget crises and general complaints of government
inefficiency have served to heighten the role for the privatization37 of
36. See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 890–91
(1978); Scott, supra note 28, at 1644–45 (reciprocity is an effective motivator for half
of the population).
37. The terms “privatization,” “public-private contracting,” “government
outsourcing,” “government service contracting,” “contracting out,” and “purchase-ofservice (POS) contracting,” all may mean different things in different contexts. But
for purposes of this Article, they are used interchangeably to indicate a contract
between a governmental entity and a private party, where the private party agrees to
provide a government service for the benefit of the public in exchange for
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government services in recent years.38 Perhaps it is unsurprising that
in the current economic climate, where state budgets in particular
are very lean, the use of privatization is on the rise and has enjoyed
widespread support across the political spectrum.39
A. Why Governments Privatize
Privatization theory suggests that privatizing should both cut costs
and simultaneously maintain or even improve service quality.40
Privatization proponents argue that governments lack adequate
incentives to work efficiently and to innovate to provide high quality
services at low cost.41 Because governments are not motivated by
seeking profits or maximizing value and do not face competition for
the provision of services,42 governments lack market motivation to
deliver services efficiently.43
Further, even with the proper incentives, governments are not
particularly adept at delivering services efficiently because they are
constrained by bureaucracy and civil services laws.44 Governments
lack the options to motivate their employees that private firms

compensation by the government. See, e.g., Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note
22, at 161 (recognizing that the bulk of privatization in the U.S. has taken the form
of government contracting); Michaels, supra note 13, at 1026 (explaining the nature
of public-private contracts). This Article does not address procurement contracts.
38. Anna Ya Ni & Stuart Bretschneider, The Decision to Contract Out: A Study of
Contracting for E-Government Services in State Governments, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 531, 532
(2007) (“As a result [of a growing desire to make government more efficient],
government contracts with the private and nonprofit sectors have rapidly increased
in volume and extended to various service areas. Indeed, the market for contracts to
provide government services has been growing faster than that of any commercial
segment.” (citations omitted)).
39. See Michaels, supra note 13, at 1025 (noting that privatization is a politically
expedient means of addressing many governmental services).
40. See, e.g., The Law of Prisons, supra note 22, at 1877–78 (early economic models
actually predicted that privatization would reduce both cost and quality, but recent
literature argues that private contractors may be motivated to innovate in a way that
cuts cost but not service quality).
41. Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1445 (2003).
42. Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2235–38. There are exceptions—
for instance, the United States Post Office—but generally speaking, this is true.
43. Id. at 2238. Governments arguably do, however, have political motivations to
deliver efficient service. The problem is, therefore, more pervasive when politically
disenfranchised groups are the service recipients. Id.
44. David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV.
393, 400–01 (2008) (noting that the complexity of services that a government may
contract out for results in intrinsic difficulties in accomplishing contractual goals).
See generally E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT pt. 3 (1987)
(describing the historical background of privatization).
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enjoy.45 Most government employees are not at-will, and therefore
the government cannot easily terminate their employment.46 The
government also has fewer tools in its tool belt, such as access to
bonuses or the ability to quickly advance high performers.
By contrast, private firms that do seek to maximize profits and do
have competitors in the marketplace will, in theory, be driven to
innovate and to provide services that are both high quality and low
cost. Private firms derive motivation from winning contracts and
then keeping the business.47 If a private firm does not deliver in a
marketplace where there are true switching options, the firm will lose
the contract at renewal (or earlier).48 Individual employees of profitseeking firms may also share the motivations of their parent firms.49
Indeed, firms take pains to align employees’ incentives with their own
by rewarding performance that furthers the firm’s profit-maximizing
goals and by punishing performance (perhaps even by termination of
employment) when employees’ work is unsatisfactory.50 Private
entities can also adjust staffing and wage levels more readily than the
government and raise capital where necessary.51

45. See Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2243 (explaining how private
sector employees’ economic welfare is often tied to the overall performance of their
employer, a scenario that largely does not exist for government employees).
46. PATRICIA H. WERHANE ET AL., EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 54, 55
(2004) (contrasting about fifty-five percent of private sector workers who are at-will
against government employees with some job security).
47. See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 41, at 1429 (opining that private firms
consistently out-perform comparable government services because private firms are
able to utilize the principle that maximizing profits is a socially desirable goal).
48. Id. at 1428.
49. See WERHANE, supra note 46, at 54–55.
50. See id. (examining the difference in motivation that job security has on
private and public employees).
51. See E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 111–12
(2000) [hereinafter SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ]; Super,
supra note 44, at 409–13 (using private entities’ choice of internal production over
obtaining goods or services from the open market to illustrate firms’ increased
flexibility in comparison to the government); see also DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER,
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 252–53 (1992) (finding that decentralized institutions offer a greater
degree of flexibility and adaptability than their centralized counterparts); Michaels,
supra note 13, at 1088; David M. Van Slyke, Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to
Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship, 17 J. PUB.
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 157, 158 (2006) (“Privatization advocates argue that
government will receive better services at lower costs because of the expertise and
innovation of private providers. This argument rests on ‘introduc[ing] competition
and market forces in[to] the delivery of public services.’” (quoting SAVAS,
PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 51, at 122)).
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B. Principal-Agent Problems
Contracting out is not without problems. In a prior Article, I
suggested that there are systematic biases in certain types of
government outsourcing such that cost cutting is prioritized over
quality service provision.52 I argued that this is particularly true where
markets are thin, where tasks are difficult to specify and monitor, and
where the outsourced service benefits a small, often disenfranchised
portion of the population. In such scenarios, I conceived of the cost
that contracting parties impose on service recipients as akin to a
negative externality that the transacting parties are not forced to
internalize. Thus, what appears to be a cost-saving mechanism is
often, in fact, a systematic market failure.
In this Article, I continue to explore the problem of the poor
service provision that can result when governments outsource, but
instead of focusing on incentive mismatches between the contracting
parties and third-party beneficiaries, I focus on incentive
misalignments between the contracting parties themselves. Here, I
assume that a government’s goal in outsourcing is to provide good
quality service (and not only to reduce cost no matter the effect on
service quality), but that governments have difficulty obtaining good
service from the private providers to which it outsources. This is a
type of agency cost. Whenever one party (the agent) contracts to
perform a service on behalf of another (the principal), the goals of
the two parties are likely to not entirely align.53 Principal-agent
theory addresses the difficulties involved when a principal motivates
its agent to act in the best interests of the principal rather than in his
or her own interests.54
Agency problems often arise when there is information
asymmetry.55 The agent is the party performing the service. The
principal does not know as much about that service provision as the
agent actually performing the service. Consider a provider of call
center services that obtains a contract to handle customer service calls
on behalf of a retail store. Those actually handling the calls know far
52.
53.

Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2238.
KIERON WALSH, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS: COMPETITION,
CONTRACTING AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 36–37 (1995); Brian Galle, Charities
in Politics: A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561, 1591–92 (2013).
54. WALSH, supra note 53, at 37.
55. See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review, 14
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989) (finding that the “agency problem” arises when a
principal and their agent have different attitudes towards control and risk); Michael
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (noting that agency costs rise
when the relationship and knowledge between principal and agent is not clearly defined).
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better the level of service they are providing than the store on whose
behalf the customer service representatives are acting. In this
situation, principals can have difficulty ascertaining whether or to
what extent a contract has been satisfied. The principal removed
from the agent cannot fully monitor its services or it may be too costly
to adequately monitor.56
If the incentives of the agent and principal are not aligned, and the
agent knows that the principal cannot easily detect its actions, the
agent will act in ways that the principal would not want it to act. This
is known as moral hazard.57 Typical examples of these sorts of agency
costs are those that arise between corporate management (agent)
and shareholders (principal).58 The principle extends to the
relationship between politicians as agent and voters as principal. In
the management-shareholder context, management might lack
sufficient incentive to maximize profits of the firm and might instead
prefer to maximize personal gain. If the shareholders cannot easily
detect that management is furthering personal gain rather than the
interests of the company, management will be more likely to act in
ways shareholders might frown upon. The political context can be
similar. There, voters select their representatives to act in their best
interests, but once elected, representatives may act in ways that will
maintain their positions of power rather than fulfill their promises to
constituents. Both examples illustrate the problems that may arise
from misaligned incentives.
The example of the USIS contract discussed above also has these
attributes.59 The contract incentivized completing the review of
applications for security clearance. USIS was therefore motivated to
“complete” applications rather than to do quality investigations. The
agency costs in that situation resulted from both incentive
misalignments (in part created by the payment mechanism under the
contract)60 and from information asymmetry. USIS was better

56. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 55, at 309 n.10; Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing
and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55, 66 (1979).
57. Schavell, supra note 56, at 66.
58. Id.
59. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text.
60. Gabriel, supra note 8 (“In interviews this week, former and current USIS
employees detailed how the company had an incentive to rush work because it is
paid only after a file is marked ‘FF,’ for fieldwork finished, and sent to the
government. In the waning days of a month, investigations were closed to meet
financial quotas, without a required review by the quality control department, two
former senior managers said.”). There was surely a better way to draft this contract
to better align incentives in the traditional model, but even so, this Article argues
that a better contract is not one predicated on that approach. Rather, a better
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positioned to know how thoroughly it had reviewed applications. The
government was at an informational disadvantage. The ramifications of
subpar contractor performance in that case were severe.61
A related issue to information asymmetry and moral hazard is that
even if the principal can obtain contract compliance from the agent,
it may have difficulty prompting best efforts.62 The literature
differentiates between perfunctory performance and consummate
performance.63 Perfunctory is performance within the letter of the
contract, and consummate is performance within the spirit of the
contract that goes beyond what is required in pursuit of a greater winwin gain.64 For instance, a contract may specify the number of jokes a
comedienne must tell, but it would be essentially impossible to specify
how funny her jokes must be. A perfunctory comedienne performing
just what is required will simply tell the required number of jokes and
will be satisfied by a reaction of mild giggles. A consummate
comedienne will work to obtain the big laughs. One difficulty that
principals face is in motivating agents to give consummate rather than
perfunctory performance.65 This is particularly true where accepted and
objective metrics for consummate performance are lacking.66
This issue is often apparent in government outsourcing contracts.67
Governments contract out to private providers to decrease cost, but

contract may simply be a less-specific one that trades on the reciprocity value
between the parties.
61. For additional examples of government contractors delivering subpar
performance due to agency costs, see Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2220–26.
62. See Ernst Fehr et al., Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence, 101
AM. ECON. REV. 493, 518–22 (2011) (considering two different models regarding
social preferences, one based on inequity aversion and one based on reciprocity, for
explaining fairness theories in contractual relationships); Yuval Feldman et al.,
Reference Points and Contractual Choices: An Experimental Examination, 10 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 512, 520 (2013); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points,
123 Q.J. ECON 1, 7–8 (2008) (postulating that a party to a contract may only put forth
his best efforts if he feels as though he is treated well).
63. Hart & Moore, supra note 62, at 6.
64. Id. at 6–8.
65. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 100–01 (1975); Hart & Moore, supra note 62, at 7; George S.
Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 974
(2007) [hereinafter Geis, Business Outsourcing] (possible risks stemming
from agency cost problems include “(1) insufficient effort or shirking; (2) lavish
compensation or self-dealing; (3) entrenchment; and (4) poor risk management”).
66. Motivating consummate performance is not as problematic when easily
observable and measurable performance metrics are available.
67. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 18, at 346 (explaining that, in the context of
governmental outsourcing, the agent has first-hand knowledge, and so it is the agent
that has the most influence).
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also to improve service quality. However, the contractor may be
tempted to provide lower effort levels than the government may want.68
Oliver Hart gives the example of a prison manager who can make
two kinds of investments: “He can invest in efficiency-enhancing
ideas that raise the quality of prison services, e.g., develop new
rehabilitation programmes; he can also spend time figuring out how
to cut costs and quality, while staying within the letter of the
contract.”69 A government’s goal, then, is to maximize its agent’s
innovative investment while minimizing the quality-shading
investment. Often, in practice, and for particular categories of
contracts,70 the quality-shading kind of investment is what results.
For instance, the City of New York outsourced welfare-to-work
services to private vendors.71 The goal of the project was to move
people into jobs that would permit economic independence.72 The
private vendors, which were paid based on placements, worked to
place the easiest candidates and ignored the more difficult cases.73
They also targeted short-term job placement that was unlikely to
stick.74 They complied with the letter of the contract, but did not
perform as the government would have liked.
Agency theory focuses on correcting for opportunistic behavior
that can result from misaligned incentives and exploiting asymmetric
information.75 It typically suggests aligning incentives such that the
rational, self-interested choices of the agent comport with the
principal’s choices. In outsourcing, agency theory focuses on the
ways in which principals can try to align incentives through contract.

68. See Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application
to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1141 (1997); Peter H. Kyle, Note, Contracting for
Performance: Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2087, 2095
(2013) (explaining that public service employees often lack motivation because they
see little return on cost reductions and quality improvements).
69. Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an
Application to Public-Private Partnerships, 113 ECON. J. C69, C71 (2003).
70. See infra Part II (discussing frequently used types of government contracts).
71. See Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power: Reconfiguring
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 286 & n.41 (2009)
(describing the failure of New York’s Employment Services and Placement program).
72. Id.
73. See id. at 291 (“[T]he incentives are structured in a way that encourages
vendors to work with those easiest to place quickly, and leave behind those that need
more support and more time for initial placement. Clients realize this and grow wary
of a system that is failing to meet their needs.”).
74. Id. at 287.
75. Donnelly, supra note 18, at 346–47 (explaining “asymmetric information,” a
problem that comes about when a private provider may have information that the
government does not, and the private provider is then motivated to further its own,
rather than the public’s, interest).
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Public law scholars who address this same problem typically focus on
accountability issues rather than agency cost.76 The focus is on providing
voters a mechanism for policing the government. Accountability, for
public law scholars, is the “central issue” in privatization.
In turning to private actors to supply education, social services,
dispute resolution, and other programs to meet basic human needs,
governments may duck public obligations and rules, become too
closely enmeshed with religion, or divert public resources to private
profits without gaining the discipline of a true economic market.
Rather than achieving increased efficiencies and improved options,
then, the privatization process risks reduced quality, unequal
treatment, and outright corruption.77
Although the public-private contracting problem does not
necessarily stem from the relationship between the two contracting
parties, Minow and others turn in part to contract solutions to
address accountability concerns.78 The next section takes up this
issue further, exploring the common mechanisms for mitigating
agency costs (or ensuring more accountability), which are also the
most common mechanisms suggested and likely employed in
government service contracts.
C. Scholarly Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems
There is much congruence in the literature that careful contract
design can align incentives.79
The literature contemplates a
76. Because I concentrate on contractor performance in this Article, I conflate
the accountability and agency cost analysis, which ultimately both suggest that
detailed contracting is the way to improve performance. However, there are crucial
differences in the two analyses, most importantly, that many public law scholars
concerned about accountability are concerned about accountability to the public, not
just to the government. For instance, making government contracts publicly
available is an equally important dimension to solving this problem.
77. Minow, supra note 22, at 1246; see also Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,”
Constitutional Accountability, and Outsourcing Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1350–52
(2013) (addressing and explaining the “Accountability Problem of Privatized
Government”); Donnelly, supra note 18, at 339–40 (using a comparative approach to discuss
challenges to accountability and human rights that arise from using privatization in the
welfare context); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1317–20, 1342 (2003) (suggesting ways to prevent governments
from avoiding duties by turning to private actors); Janna J. Hansen, Note, Limits of
Competition: Accountability in Government Contracting, 112 YALE L.J. 2465, 2475 (2003)
(arguing that the contracting process of private government contractors is often
confidential and without judicial review, leading to accountability issues).
78. Minow, supra note 22, at 1260–61 (discussing contractual mechanisms for
ensuring accountability to public values in the context of privatization).
79. See, e.g., MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL
CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 144–45 (2000) (discussing ways to avoid major
sources of conflict, thus aligning incentives); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy,
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 226 (1990)
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multiplicity of ways to align incentives, from profit sharing to piecerate compensation to bonding, among others.80 Most relevant for
present purposes is the method that suggests highly specifying tasks
and/or outcomes, monitoring, and relating performance to financial
punishments or rewards due ex post.81
1. Mitigating agency costs through specification, monitoring, and incentivebased compensation
Agency theory assumes that agents are rational, selfish actors looking
for opportunities to shirk under a contract. A rational agent that knows
its actions cannot be adequately detected by a principal will act to
maximize its own profit even in ways the principal may not want.
Accordingly, a principal may better position itself by designing a
contract that aligns incentives so that an agent will be honest and follow
the rules. Contracts must work within incentive compatibility constraints.
a.

In general

First, specifying tasks can be an important contracting
mechanism.82 Although scholars have established that no contract
can be entirely complete,83 there are nonetheless a number of
benefits to specifying tasks. It gives the agent guidance on exactly
what is required so that expectations are aligned. And it gives the
principal something to monitor or with which to ensure compliance.
It also limits the risk of a court later wrongly interpreting contractual
intent.84 Ultimately, the argument is that specification of tasks is
necessary for agent accountability.85
(examining the relationship between contract clarity and compensation policy);
Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 394 (2003)
(discussing the continual negotiation process that accompanies an incomplete
contract); cf. Rigdon, supra note 33, at 18, 25 (noting that further study should be
conducted on how to efficiently structure incentives through contracting).
80. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Regulator Effect in Financial Regulation, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 591, 603 (2013) (suggesting several different methods used to aid
principals and agents in aligning interests).
81. See, e.g., Hart, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 69, at C70 (noting the
prevailing sentiment that a government need not own a firm to control its behavior:
“any goalseconomic or otherwisecan be achieved via a detailed initial contract”).
82. See Margaret M. Blair et al., Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm,
2011 BYU L. REV. 263, 263 (stating that large projects can be broken down into
smaller “modular” tasks).
83. See Hart, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 69, at C71 (positing that no contract
is considered complete in the property rights model).
84. See Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial
Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 121 (2003).
85. In the corporate context, however, there tends to be less reliance on task
specification.
Particularly where managers can be given flexibility but are
incentivized to maximize firm profit, it is less necessary and perhaps less desirable to
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Second, and related, monitoring (either directly or through
market mechanisms) can be an essential component of mitigating
agency costs.86 Explicit monitoring rights in transactions range from
audit procedures to in-person visits to observe the agent in practice.87
Monitoring is costly, but it is generally required to reduce an agent’s
temptation to engage in self-interested behavior that will harm the
enterprise or, in other words, to reduce the information asymmetry
that contributes to agency costs in the first place.88 In corporate
contexts, the market may do some of the work aligning incentives.89
Particularly if the principal may become aware of an agent shirking,
the principal will utilize switching options, and the agent will suffer
reputational sanctions.90 Therefore, a thick market and good
information can dissuade agents from performing poorly.91
Third, the literature recommends the use of performance-based
Fixed payment regimes
compensation to align interests.92
unconnected to performance or task completion may do little to
incentivize agents to do good work.93 There are, however, many ways
to use compensation to motivate agents. Options range from
payment for achieving certain pre-defined goals to penalties for
failure to achieve goals.94 Other incentives aligning compensation
are also available. What has become the traditional example is
specify tasks too discretely. William J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in
the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 416
(suggesting that firms generally prefer to motivate managers through the use of
incentives, rather than to specify the manager’s duties).
86. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 55, at 323–24.
87. See Geis, Business Outsourcing, supra note 65, at 993 (explaining that there are
several ways to mitigate costs, including writing monitoring into the contract or the
practice of extensive audits).
88. Id.
89. See Carney, supra note 85, at 387 (positing that incentives can often be
aligned in the corporate context through compensation provisions).
90. See Davidson, supra note 22, at 306, 313 (hypothesizing that a relational
approach may minimize instances of shirking and that incentivizing providers may
help to avoid a stain on the government’s reputation).
91. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive
Pay: Contractual Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1187 (2011) (“Divergence of
interests between managers and shareholders can be reduced by: (a) investing in
monitoring devices, such as oversight, auditing, and internal controls . . . .”); Eugene
F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 295–97 (1980)
(discussing the extent to which market forces can discipline managers and prevent
them from shirking).
92. Carney, supra note 85, at 415–16 (recommending the use of incentives based
on performance for corporate managers to align interests); Cunningham, supra note
91, at 1187 (finding that compensation contracts are often an efficient way to reduce
costs and align shareholder and manager interests).
93. Carney, supra note 85, at 416.
94. See Feldman et al., supra note 62, at 533 (contending that one way to
incentivize best efforts is to frame payoffs as losses rather than gains).
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incentivizing corporate managers with stock so that the agent is
motivated to maximize the overall profitability of the firm.95
A study of commercial outsourcing agreements confirmed that
firms employ many of these mechanisms.96 Particularly in higher
agency cost situations, firms are more likely to structure agreements
with extensive financial incentives and control rights, considerable
monitoring, and economic consequences linked to performance.97
b.

In government service contracting

Applying general insights from agency theory to government
service contracting seems to yield the conclusion that similar
mechanisms would work well in this slightly different context.
Indeed, the vast majority of economists and public law scholars
addressing agency costs in government service contracting have taken
a “complete” or “formalist” contracting perspective. Following the
assumption that agency costs arise because of asymmetric
information, moral hazard, and shirking, they suggest that similar
mechanisms may mitigate agency costs in other contexts.98 The most
common suggestion for obtaining better quality service is to draft
more specific contracts (in particular, to better specify tasks and
performance metrics), include monitoring provisions, and tie agent
performance to compensation.99 Public law scholars and economists
who write on this topic largely agree as to this approach.100 As Nestor
Davidson has put it, “Commentators concerned with capturing
privatization’s benefits and muting its potential harms often call for
additional government control of private providers through their
contractual agreements, specifying in ever-more-careful terms the

95. Carney, supra note 85, at 416.
96. George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions,
96 VA. L. REV. 241, 278 (2010) [hereinafter Geis, An Emprical Examination].
97. See id. (concluding that a pattern of control and monitoring emerges where
parties select “firm-like” provisions to govern incentives).
98. See, e.g., Geis, Business Outsourcing, supra note 65, at 982–84 (stating that
asymmetrical information is persistent and offering strategies to combat it).
99. See, e.g., John Forrer et al., Public-Private Partnerships and the Public
Accountability Question, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 475, 478 (2010) (“The most common
suggestion for obtaining better quality service is to draft more specific contracts with
incentives that track to agent performance”).
100. Freeman, supra note 77, at 1317, 1351 (“[T]here might be considerable
agreement between the economic and public law views about the importance of clear
and enforceable contractual terms to the success of privatization.”); see also Davidson,
supra note 22, at 277 (noting commentators’ views that privatization is best
approached through contracts that “are clear, thorough, accurate, and
unambiguous” (quoting SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS,
supra note 51, at 188)).
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scope of the engagement and monitoring providers with evergreater oversight.”101
The logic is evident. The government as the only buyer has
substantial bargaining power. It can, therefore, set the parameters of
the relationship. In addition to standard contract terms such as
compensation and contract duration, some scholars encourage
parties to specify tasks, outcome measures, and incentives or
sanctions.102 By specifying tasks, the government defines the actions
the vendor must undertake to ensure the service meets the
government’s specifications.103 For example, a contract may specify
how many times a vendor should meet with mental health patients.
Outcome measures (performance-based criteria) dictate results that a
vendor must accomplish, for instance, moving a designated
percentage of people off of the welfare rolls. Finally, monetary
incentives or sanctions reward or penalize the vendor for either
failing to meet or succeeding in meeting certain goals.
In addition to specifying tasks, outcome measures, and incentives,
governments are also encouraged to include reporting requirements
and monitoring rights in their contracts.104 If the government utilizes
these contractual control mechanisms it can, in theory, ensure
compliance with program goals. This is particularly true, so the

101. Davidson, supra note 22, at 263; see also Laura A. Dickinson, Public
Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 14, at 335, 336, 338
(arguing that performance metrics, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms in
international outsourcing contracts should be bolstered); JOHN REHFUSS, DESIGNING
AN EFFECTIVE BIDDING AND MONITORING SYSTEM TO MINIMIZE PROBLEMS IN COMPETITIVE
CONTRACTING
6–8
(1993),
available
at
http://reason.org/files/
02e4e0b06250ddff83fe1732c011f696.pdf (arguing specificity of the contract, and in
particular service specifications, is important for both the bidding process and the
monitoring process); Savas, Privatization in State and Local Government, supra note 18,
at 99; Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 172
(2005); Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 22, at 170–71; Freeman, Extending
Public Law Norms, supra note 77, at 1341; Minow, supra note 22, at 1267; Parkin, supra
note 22, at 1348 (“[W]ithout contractual provisions that counteract incentives to cut
recipients off the rolls, the post-1996 rise in privatization increases the risk that
welfare benefits are erroneously terminated.”); Romzek & Johnston, supra note 18, at
438 (arguing contract specificity of parties’ duties and obligations is important for
accountability and proposing contracts that clearly articulate responsibilities);
Stevenson, supra note 84, at 126–31 (arguing for more stringent contractual
safeguards to protect welfare recipients); Kyle, supra note 68, at 2111–12 (suggesting
a graduated bonus system tied to recidivism rates in private prisons); Beuve &
Chever, supra note 14, at 3–4.
102. Brown et al., Managing Public Service Contracts, supra note 22, at 327.
103. Trevor L. Brown et al., Trust and Contract Completeness in the Public Sector, 33
LOC. GOV.’T STUD. 607, 609 (2007).
104. Brown et al., Managing Public Service Contracts, supra note 22, at 327–28.
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argument goes, if it can adequately monitor the private service
provider to observe compliance with performance metrics.105
Although the next Section addresses some of the incomplete
contracting literature, the extent to which there is majority scholarly
agreement over use of formal contracting mechanisms in the
privatization context cannot be overstated.106 For instance, Jody
Freeman has advocated for “greater specificity of terms, graduated
penalties, and oversight by a ‘contract manager’” in the nursing
home context.107 Martha Minow has suggested: “As drafter of the
contracts, and the piper calling the tune, the government can set
extensive and detailed public requirements.”108 Alexander “Sasha”
Volokh states: “there is no substitute for performance contracts that
encourage quality improvements, effective monitoring, and information
gathering and disclosure.”109 Writing about the privatization of
foreign affairs functions, Laura Dickinson suggests “[c]ontracts could
be drafted to explicitly extend relevant norms of public international
law to private contractors, provide for enhanced oversight and
enforcement, and include more specific terms . . . .”110
2.

Relational contracting
Although detailed, incentive-based contracting is the most
prevalent scholarly suggestion, other contracting approaches, namely
relational contracting and contracting for innovation, are methods
worth considering.
Relational contracting is often considered the counterpoint to the
traditional transaction contemplated in the prior Section.111 There is
no universally adopted definition of relational contracting, but it
generally refers to a scenario where the relationship between the
parties takes center stage, not the language of the contract itself.112
105. Id. at 328; see also RUSSELL W. HINTON, COMPONENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE
CONTRACT MONITORING SYSTEM 4 (2003), available at http://www.dca.ga.gov/
housing/housingdevelopment/BestPractices_ContractMonitoring.pdf (explaining that
contract monitoring ensures adequate performance).
106. See Freeman, supra note 77, at 1350–51 (arguing that “there might be
considerable agreement between the economic and public law views about the
importance of clear and enforceable contractual terms to the success of privatization”).
107. Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 22, at 202.
108. MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC
GOOD 33 (2002).
109. The Law of Prisons, supra note 22, at 1887.
110. Laura Dickinson, Contract as a Tool for Regulating Private Military Companies, in
FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY
COMPANIES 217, 218 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007).
111. See supra Part II.C.1.
112. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1090–91 (1981).
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One view distinguishes traditional contract arrangements specified at
the time of contracting from circumstances, usually involving longterm contracts, where it is not feasible to draft a completely
contingent contract at the time of entering into the transaction.113 In
such a scenario, parties resort to broader standards to dictate
behavior, such as “best efforts” clauses, or they find ways to solve
agency costs through monitoring or bonding mechanisms (like
unilateral termination clauses).114 But the touchstone of relational
contracting is a focus on building trust through repeated or longterm interactions.115
There is also a broader view of relational contracting, where
contracts are deemed “relational” when the parties act according to
norms that do not exist in the written contract.116 In that view, the
written contract itself might be very specific. Nonetheless, it does not
completely govern the parties’ relationship. The focus is on the
informal ways parties ignore the terms of the contract through
conduct.117 Under the broader definition, every contract is relational
to some extent.
The second alternative to highly specified, formal, incentive-based
contracting is “contract[ing] for innovation” through a process called
braiding.118 Proponents of braiding argue that there is too much
focus on formal contract mechanisms and informal contract
mechanisms as distinct approaches.119 In practice, braiding advocates

113. Id. at 1091.
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 36, at 886–87. But see Goetz & Scott, supra note
112, at 1090–91 (stating that “temporal extension per se is not the defining
characteristic” of relational contracts).
116. See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1725 (2001)
(using the cotton industry as a case study to consider the importance of external
factors beyond the written contract that strengthen contractual relationships in
industry); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 877, 877–78 (2000) (surveying the theory of relational contracts and defining
“contract” as “relations in which exchange occurs,” rather than as specifically
prescribed transactions); see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in
Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56, 62 (1963) (finding that, among
a sampling of the manufacturing industry, the role of non-contractual practices in
exchanges is often significant); Macneil, Contracts, supra note 36, at 888–89 (arguing
against a neoclassical theory of contract law that mandates the entire contractual
relation could or should be “encompassed in some original assent to it”).
117. See, e.g., Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and
Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 945–46 (2009).
118. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 30, at 1382–83. “Braiding” refers to the
process of incorporating both formal and informal contracting to accommodate
uncertainty and to foster mutual innovation between contracting parties. Id.
119. Id. at 1388.
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suggest there is often an intertwining of the two.120 Particularly where
two parties enter into a transaction where the ultimate product or
service cannot be specified because it is not yet determined, formal
and informal terms must be weaved together.121 A contract for
innovation will be formal in the sense that it defines a governance
process122 and specifies formal mechanisms for sharing information, but
it will be informal in terms of substantive performance requirements.123
One challenge to the braiding concept is that experiments have
found a crowding out effect against the backdrop of formal
contracts.124 Braiding does still rely on formal contracts to some
degree.125 There is speculation that the informal aspects of contracts
for innovation will mitigate the effect of crowding out, but this theory
has yet to be tested.126
Braiding is essentially a specific application of relational
contracting because its primary goals are to permit the parties to
build trust and to enhance the likelihood of a successful long-term
relationship through a focus on contract governance.127 But, while
the idea of relational contracting dates back to the 1960s and 1970s
with the seminal works of Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil, two of
the preeminent scholars on relational contract theory, the primary
focus in government service contracting remains on the classical,
formal approach.128
D. Current Practice Likely Matches Theory: Writing Detailed Contracts
with Monitoring
There has been far too little study of the actual content of
government service contracts. However, it is widely believed that
detailed and incentive-based contracting is the most utilized model in

120. Id. at 1388–89.
121. Id. at 1383.
122. Id. at 1384 (suggesting that formal contracts are utilized for “exchanging
information about the progress and prospects of their joint activities” where such
information exchanges “provide the foundation for raising the existing level of trust”).
123. Id.
124. See id. at 1381 n.6 (cataloging studies that have shown the crowding out
effect under formal contracting).
125. Id. at 1382 (noting that parties “are responding to rising uncertainty” by “writ[ing]
contracts that intertwine elements of formal and informal contracting” mechanisms).
126. Id. at 1386 (“We argue that the endogeneity of the informal mechanisms in
the contract—i.e., that they are largely created by the information exchange
established in the formal contract—may well eliminate the risk of crowding out.”).
127. Id. at 1386–87.
128. Supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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practice.129 Further, government contracts are generally understood
to be even more detailed than entirely commercial counterparts.130
Limited studies confirm these intuitions, but there is much room for
additional work in this area.131
It is, however, relatively easy to locate examples of detailed,
incentive-based contracts in government service contracting. For
instance, when Indiana contracted out to IBM to administer public
benefits for the state, the contract “contain[ed] more than 160 pages
plus extensive attachments, including 10 exhibits, 24 schedules, and
10 appendices, encompassing all aspects of the parties’ working
relationship.”132 In substance, there were a wide variety of control
mechanisms, including detailed performance metrics and
performance-based compensation.133
In addition, studies of outsourcing in the analogous commercial
context have confirmed that in higher agency cost situations,
principals try to exert more control over their agents through
contract mechanisms like detailed task specification and monitoring.134
The government contracting context is likely to be similar.
Although better agent control is the primary motivating factor
behind detailed contracting, there are additional reasons for parties
to prefer detailed contracting. For instance, a detailed contract may
insulate a government agent from fallout if the service provision is
129. See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 22, at 1346 (discussing the prevalence of welfare
privatization contracts that contain performance-based incentive compensation
despite limited efficacy).
130. See, e.g., Mary K. Marvel & Howard P. Marvel, The Ratio of Beef Cubes to Onion
(6:1) in Hungarian Goulash and Public Sector Contracting: Market-Like or Market-Lite?,
POL’Y CURRENTS, Summer 2003, at 2, 2 (noting that the nature of public sector
contracts may “vary systematically” from that of commercial contracts in terms of
complexity and specificity); Praxis Solutions, Inc., supra note 25, at 4.
131. See Jérôme Barthélemy & Bertrand V. Quélin, Complexity of Outsourcing
Contracts and Ex Post Transaction Costs: An Empirical Investigation, 43 J. MGMT. STUD.
1775, 1776 (2006) (analyzing a number of outsourcing contracts to compare
contract complexity against ex post transactional costs); Dickinson, Government for
Hire, supra note 101, at 142–43, 171 (describing the privatization of governmental
functions in the international context and suggesting that more highly specified
contracting could bring oversight and accountability); Marvel & Marvel, supra note
130, at 2–3 (comparing food vendor contracts for public and private entities and
finding that government contracts tend to be more specified than commercial
contracts for the same services); Romzek & Johnston, supra note 18, at 436–37 (2005)
(assessing state social service contracts in Kansas to determine the factors that
increase contract accountability).
132. Indiana v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 9
(Ind. Super. Ct. July 18, 2012).
133. Id. at 15–17.
134. See Blair et al., supra note 82, at 293–94 (discussing specification of terms and
procedures in the context of analyzing law firm outsourcing contracts); Geis, An
Empirical Examination, supra note 96, at 271–72 (quantifying offshore business
outsourcing contracts to gauge, among other factors, control features).
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ultimately poor.135 In other words, the government actor could argue
that he or she wrote a “good” contract and, therefore, should not be
blamed for contractor errors. With pressure to enhance public
accountability, detailed contracting provides some insulation for the
drafter and a possible reduction in risk.
Economically rational outside legal counsel (for both sides) likely
also prefer drafting detailed contracts for similar reasons, but also
because the cost of drafting thorough contracts ex ante is likely to be
higher, leading to higher compensation for the lawyer (assuming
hourly-based or complexity-based payment structures).136 A large
part of the role of the lawyer in contract drafting is to anticipate
potential problems ex post. There is pressure to be as detailed and
specific as possible not only to set expectations for contractor
behavior, but also to have contractual language to point to if
litigation later materializes.137
The private provider might also prefer more detail. With a better
sense of exactly what is required, the contractor can more accurately
bid on its services. The contractor can also make a better case that it
successfully completed work when what counts as “success” was clear
from the contract ex ante. A contractor might argue that it needs to
know what the government has hired it to do.
All are potentially valid reasons to prefer detailed contracts that
highly specify tasks. However, the next Part discusses why such detailed
contracts often do not work in complex government service contracting.
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH OFTEN FAILS
Despite the relative unanimity of theory and the intuitive appeal of
the detailed contracting approach, there are many problems with the
approach in practice, particularly for certain types of government
service contracts. In prior work, I defined a category of government
service contracts with high agency costs.138 I argued in particular that
where a service is difficult to specify and monitor, the market for
private providers is thin, and service recipients amount to a narrow,
disenfranchised segment of the population, we tend to see contracts
that are biased to result in cost savings at the sacrifice of service

135. See Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2242 (noting that outsourcing
permits the government to “point its finger at the private entity”).
136. Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (discussing the
sociolegal deterrents to incomplete contracting).
137. Id. at 29.
138. Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2215–16.
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quality.139 This is because the government lacks adequate incentive to
procure good quality service and lacks the tools to obtain such service
from its private agent.140 I conceived of low quality service as a
negative externality imposed on service recipients that the transacting
parties were not forced to internalize.141 Because of the very
characteristics that bias contracts to result in negative externalities, I
suggest in this Section that the traditional methods for mitigating
agency costs tend not to be effective.
Government service can be conceived of as existing on a threedimensional spectrum, where the axes are ease of specification and
monitoring, extent of market competition, and portion of the
population affected by the service. In one quadrant are outsourcing
contracts that are more likely to succeed at reducing cost while
improving service quality.
The public management literature
describes such contracts as those for “hard services.”142 Hard services
are easy to specify and monitor.143 Typically, there is a competitive
market for providers of hard services.144 And they are easy to specify
and monitor and affect a large portion of the population.
Conventional examples include garbage collection and road repair.145
Traditional mechanisms for controlling agency costs are likely to
work relatively well for these services.146 For instance, using the
garbage collection example, it is easy to specify what the government
seeks—a contractor to collect and dispose of trash at all residences
and businesses in a community pursuant to a schedule. If the
contractor fails in this task, it will be obvious. Residents and business
owners will see their trash not being collected and will complain.
Their complaints will be heard and will effect change because the
whole community is affected and collectively has political power. The
contractor will heed these complaints and remedy any performance not
in keeping with the requirements of its detailed contract or else risk
being replaced by another contractor available in the marketplace.

139. Id. at 2216.
140. Id.
141. Other scholars have described this category of contracts as one that simply
should not be outsourced at all. See, e.g., Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work,
supra note 14, at 49 (listing three criteria that should be present before a government
function may be “split off[:] specificity, ease of evaluation, and competition”).
142. Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2218–19.
143. Id. at 2219.
144. Id. at 2219–20 & n.37.
145. Id. at 2219. It happens that typically, hard government services also affect a wide
segment of the population and tend to have a competitive market for providers. Id.
146. Id. at 2219–20 & n.37.
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Knowing of these potential consequences will cause the provider to
refrain from opportunistic actions. A garbage collector is not likely
to shirk when faced with a contract that specifies tasks because it
knows the government has switching options if service quality is poor.
And it knows that the government will likely discover when service
quality is poor because even if the government does a poor job
monitoring, the market will convey performance information. In
short, the traditional detailed contracting method is likely to work
well against the backdrop of hard contracts.147
On the other end of the three-dimensional spectrum are “soft
services,”148 where the traditional detailed contracting is likely to work
much less well. In soft services, people are typically the service-focus,
and there is more difficulty defining, measuring, and monitoring
execution.149 Soft services have been termed “complex human
services” and usually involve significant discretion on the part of the
service provider.150
Examples include running prisons and
administering welfare benefits.151 These services also happen to
involve small, disenfranchised portions of the population.
One might argue, and several have, that soft services simply should
not be outsourced.152 There might be merit in that argument.
Nonetheless, the reality is that this category of service is subject to
increased government outsourcing,153 and there is little reason to
believe that the trend will reverse. As such, this Article focuses on how
contracting mechanisms might obviate the most common problems.

147. Beuve & Chever, supra note 14, at 2–6 (citing quantitative studies showing
that outsourcing contracts—for hard services such as cleaning and garbage
collection—actually “allows to reduce cost” but “at the expense of quality”). Also,
relatively speaking, not much innovation is required in such contexts.
148. Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2218–19.
149. Id. at 2219. This dichotomy of course is overly simplistic because few services
fall clearly into one category or the other. It is more accurate to conceive of services
existing somewhere along a three-dimensional spectrum.
150. Id.
151. Id. It happens that many soft services impact narrow, disenfranchised
segments of the population, and markets for providers are thin. Id. at 2219–20.
152. Eduardo Porter, When Public Outperforms Private in Services, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/business/when-privatization-works-andwhy-it-doesnt-always.html?_r=0 (proposing that the private sector will be better-suited
than the public sector to perform a given task when “the task is clear-cut and it’s
possible to define concrete goals and reward those who meet them” and the parties
can “‘rule out cream-skimming and can ensure the measure is not gamed,’” as
opposed to tasks in contracts with “complex and diffuse” objectives that “mak[e] it
difficult to align profit with goals,” which are less suitable for privatization).
153. Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2213 (“[S]tate governments’ use of
privatization is on the rise.”).
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A. Task Specification Is Ineffective and Costly
The first tenet of the traditional method for mitigating agency costs
is task specification.154 By definition, for the universe of contracts
contemplated in this Article, there are difficulties in defining tasks or
in clearly defining outcomes that are measurable and subject to
monitoring or reporting.
For many complex services, it can be difficult to “‘writ[e] clear
contracts with specific goals against which contractors can be held
accountable.’”155 While it may be easy to specify what it means to be
an effective pot-hole filler, consider how difficult it is to specify what
it means to run a good prison or what it means to do a good job
investigating files for purposes of security clearance decisions.156 If it
is difficult to clearly specify tasks or outcome measures, it follows that
task specification will not work well to constrain agency costs.157 Take
the theoretical example of the government hiring a private agency to
conduct foreign affairs. It would be nearly impossible to specify in
advance the exact requirements of the private firm. The government
could not even predict ex ante what issues might arise.158 Any
attempt to highly specify tasks would necessarily be incomplete.
Focusing on outcomes can similarly be problematic because the
methods used to obtain the outcomes might not be desirable. For
instance, in the welfare-to-work context, setting a goal of returning
more applicants to work resulted in profit-seekers “creaming”
applications—selecting those who are easier to serve or more likely to
be successful, and avoiding the harder cases.159
When the U.S. government outsourced security clearance
processes to USIS, the impetus for the decision was the backlog in
applications.160 The contract, therefore, focused on rewarding the
timely processing of the applications.161 It now seems obvious that
154. Cf. id. at 2234.
155. Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 600 (2001) (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-986, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION POSES CHALLENGES IN ENSURING
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM RESULTS 14 (1997)).
156. It may seem that the federal government just wrote a poor contract for USIS
and perhaps that is the case. But even outcome-based contracts are criticized for
failure to prompt consummate performance.
157. On the other hand, the traditional method will often work well for more
discrete tasks. For instance, one could easily imagine a contract for road repair that
awards the filling of a certain number of potholes within a certain time period.
158. Shapiro, supra note 79, at 417–18 (noting that specifying tasks in advance is
particularly challenging where, as with many enforcement issues in foreign affairs,
the “resolution . . . inevitably involves a discretionary judgment”).
159. Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2249, 2253.
160. Gabriel, Shortcuts, supra note 8.
161. Id.
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the contract incentives (completing the processing of applications
over thoroughly investigating backgrounds) were the wrong ones, but
often it is difficult to create performance-incentives because of
incompatible goals (in the case of USIS, speed versus thoroughness).
Whereas one instinct might be that the USIS example is just one of a
poorly designed contract, almost any other outcome or performancefocused alternative has significant problems.
Outsourcing education can be similarly troubling in this regard. In
the context of education, one might also specify desired outcomes
rather than tasks; for instance, one might state that students are to
achieve particularized scores on standardized tests.162 Specifying
desired outcomes, however, only incentivizes teaching to the test
instead of encouraging good teaching.163 The distinction between
perfunctory and consummate behavior comes back into the analysis
here. Accordingly, it is difficult to force compliance with overall
service provision goals solely through more detailed requirements or
even outcome-based rewards.164
Even if it is possible to specify either tasks or outcomes, the best
possible outcome for the principal is to get just what it requested.
Extreme specification kills the very innovation that contracting out
was supposed to enable. In other words, privatization theory suggests
that private service providers not constrained by government
bureaucracy are more likely to innovate to provide better quality
service at lower cost. In practice, however, the intense specification
of tasks in incentive contracts vastly reduces the space in which
providers are left to innovate.
If a highly specific contract defines tasks that must be completed,
the best case scenario is that agents will comply. “The more we
reward those things that we can measure, and not reward the things
we care about but don’t measure, the more we will distort
behavior.”165 Put another way, “‘[i]f what gets measured is what gets
managed, then what gets managed is what gets done.’”166

162. JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE
MEANS 219 (1989).
163. See Porter, supra note 152 (“Unsupervised apple pickers who are paid by the
apple will probably pick them off the ground.”).
164. See, e.g., Wisconsin Works (W-2) Contract and Implementation (C&I)
Committee, Meeting Minutes 1 (July 18, 2008), available at http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/
w2/ci/2008/pdf/07_08/july_08_ci_final_notes.pdf (specifying issues that state
agencies in Wisconsin expressed with regard to the disconnect between performance
standards and “overarching goals”).
165. Porter, supra note 152.
166. Id.
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Finally, highly specifying contracts carries with it a large cost. In a
bid situation, the government contracting agents spend many hours
specifying the terms of the bid up front. In a negotiated contract
scenario, both parties may negotiate the terms of the deal over a
lengthy period. The traditional argument is that this ex ante cost is
justified (or at least may be justified) to prevent the ex post cost of
litigation. Nevertheless, if the intense specification does not actually
produce better results by means of better agent performance, as I
argue, then the cost incurred in specification is actually decreasing
the net gain for the parties.
Accordingly, although task specification is supposed to deter
opportunistic behavior on the part of the agent, for complex services,
specification is not likely to have the desired effect.167
B. Monitoring Is Both Difficult and Expensive to Conduct
A related problem is that it is both difficult and costly to monitor
complex government services. Monitoring theoretically mitigates
agency costs by constraining a contractor’s opportunity to shirk.168 In
practice, however, the efficient use of monitoring depends on the
precision with which the government defines the tasks and the
observability of relevant behavior.169
Monitoring is also costly, and with increased monitoring difficulty
comes increased cost. Monitoring is particularly difficult for soft
government services that are large, complicated, and removed from
the public eye.170 While government officials can make unannounced
visits to private prisons, it would be difficult to adequately observe the

167. Shapiro, supra note 79, at 417 (“The literature on outsourcing government
services recognizes . . . that it is easier to contract for government services in cases
where the parameters of a vendor’s performance can be clearly specified in
advance.”). In her work, Shapiro compares the relative ease of contracting for
garbage pickup against the more difficult prospect of contracting for private prisons,
noting that “the former function does not require discretionary judgments by private
employees in circumstances in which it is difficult to specify in advance how the
employees should act.” Id.
168. See Trevor L. Brown & Matthew Potoski, Transaction Costs and Contracting:
The Practitioner Perspective, 28 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 326, 328, 330 (2005).
169. See id. at 330.
170. See id. at 332 (explaining that government services with low asset specificity,
or a high likelihood that the resources applied to delivering the service can be
applied to other services, are easier to monitor because the services can be
performed by a greater number of potential vendors and the services can be easily
measured and directly observed).
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goings on at entire institutions. Monitoring also requires expertise,
which government officials often lack.171
Many studies have found that governments under-monitor when
they outsource complex services.172 This may have to do with the
difficulty of monitoring when tasks are not adequately specified, the
cost involved in effectively monitoring, or the imprecision in
monitoring. For instance, one study of local government outsourcing
conducted in 2007 found that 58% of the sample “questioned the
validity of the information obtained from monitoring.”173
The accuracy of the data was questioned primarily because quality
assessments are based on infrequent visits (18%) and evaluations
are made based on snapshot depictions (40%) of on-site conditions
that are susceptible to manipulation by providers (i.e., this
response reflects concern that conditions on-site are “staged” for
visits by monitors).174

Other studies have found similar results.175
As with task specification, monitoring is not likely to have the
desired effect of constraining agency costs.
C. Thin Market Does Not Constrain Opportunism
The absence of a well-functioning market provides an additional
challenge to the function of the traditional contract approach. The
traditional method assumes that an agent will be dissuaded from
performing poorly because the principal will know what amounts to
poor performance, will become aware of poor performance, and will
have switching options in the marketplace. An agent who wants to
avoid losing the contract at renewal, or who is concerned about
reputational consequences of poor performance, will make every
effort to perform well. A well-functioning market is integral to the
success of the traditional approach because without true switching

171. See Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1499 (2009) (alluding to the government’s lack of expertise by
pointing out that it often monitors the easiest measurement available, which is cost).
172. See Mildred E. Warner et al., Contracting Back In: When Privatization Fails, in THE
MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 2003 30, 36 (2003) (noting that in a survey most of the respondents
reported some level of contracting out but fewer than half reported any monitoring).
173. Dicke, supra note 22, at 460.
174. Id.
175. In one study, fewer than half of the responding municipal governments
reported doing any monitoring. Mildred E. Warner & Amir Hefetz, Cooperative
Competition: Alternative Service Delivery, 2002–2007, in THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 2009
11, 14, 18 (2009) (reporting private entities responsible for more than 25% of local
or municipal service delivery); see also Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private
Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 491 (2005) (describing a December 1997 survey of state and
federal government agencies reporting that almost 30% did no monitoring at all).
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options in the marketplace, the agent would not be dissuaded from
acting opportunistically because the agent would not fear losing the
contract at renewal or general reputational sanctions.
This precondition of a well-functioning market, however,
oftentimes does not exist. In one instance in New Jersey, there was
only one bidder for a contract to run a 450-bed immigrant detention
center.176 The list of outsourcing contracts entered into after a single
bid, or a low number of bids, is a long one.177 Studies have also
confirmed the anecdotal evidence of thin markets for certain types of
government services.178
There may be many reasons for thin markets. Sometimes the
government contracts out for services that did not previously exist.179
While markets may develop, for instance for private prisons, only
resource-rich companies are likely to be able to compete.180 Even so,
once a provider wins the initial contract, it gains an advantage that
may be hard for other companies to overcome. For this reason, there
tends to be consolidation of firms in specified markets for
government services over time.181
Whereas effective markets can help overcome principal-agent
problems, public-private contracting markets are thin. For this
reason, as well, traditional methods of specifying tasks, monitoring,
176. Sam Dolnick, Reversing Course, Officials in New Jersey Cancel One-Bid Immigrant
Jail Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/
nyregion/essex-county-reverses-decision-on-detention-center-bid.html.
177. For example, in Connecticut, Colonial Cooperative Care, Inc. was the only
bidder for its contract to determine eligibility for disability-based cash assistance. See
generally Stevenson, supra note 84, at 91, 105.
178. For instance, a 2007 survey of city and municipal governments found that,
on average, there are fewer than two provider options for city service contracts. See
Warner & Hefetz, supra note 175, at 11, 17. State governments also experience thin
markets as they increase their reliance on contracts for service delivery. For a good
summary of studies competition in local and state-level outsourcing, see Jocelyn M.
Johnston & Barbara S. Romzek, Social Welfare Contracts as Networks: The Impact of
Network Stability on Management and Performance, 40 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 115, 141 (2008)
(providing an example from Kansas, where a few primary contractors have
dominated and shifted negotiating power away from the state purchaser); Van Slyke,
Mythology of Privatization, supra note 14, at 299 (providing a summary of studies
regarding competition in local and state-level outsourcing); Mildred E. Warner &
Germà Bel, Competition or Monopoly? Comparing Privatization of Local Public Services in
the US and Spain, 86 PUB. ADMIN. 723, 725 (2008) (explaining the concentration of
private contractors in the waste industry).
179. In reality, governments often buy a wide range of goods and services for
which there is no preexisting market so there are only a limited number of suppliers.
180. Stevenson, supra note 84, at 91.
181. See Bach, supra note 71, at 299 n.100 (stating that over time vendors tend to
become established as the providers for a particular program); Mark Schlesinger et
al., Competitive Bidding and States’ Purchase of Services: The Case of Mental Health Care in
Massachusetts, 5 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 245, 253 (1986) (describing the multiple
forces encouraging consolidation among contractors for mental health services in
Massachusetts—forces such as economies of scale in both provisioning and bidding).
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and tying performance to compensation often do not adequately
constrain opportunistic behavior or, even better, prompt best efforts.182
D. Risk of Corruption
The traditional model does little to account for the risk of
corruption, which is particularly high in the world of government
service contracting. As myriad examples indicate, the companies that
receive lucrative contracts may do so on the basis of political or
economic connections, rather than merit.
For instance, in Pennsylvania, two judges received $2.6 million over
seven years from Pennsylvania Child Care LLC, a private company
that operated a juvenile detention center, in return for helping to
secure the company a twenty-year, $58 million contract with the
county.183 The judges were charged with aggressively sentencing
children for minor infractions to ensure that the detention center
remained at capacity.184 In early 2009, the two judges were charged
with racketeering, extortion, bribery, money laundering, and fraud,
among other crimes.185 Also in 2009, a county commission president
in Alabama was convicted of taking bribes to steer government
business to J.P. Morgan.186
Simply put, corruption may also blunt the impact of actions meant
to control agency costs.187 A party that knows it will win a contract
renewal on the basis of bribes rather than performance will not be
incentivized to deliver better performance.188
E. Studies Demonstrate Problems with Traditional Approach
Theory aside, some preliminary empirical studies have now shown
that in certain types of public-private contracting, highly detailed and
specific contractual requirements do not positively correlate with

182. See Schlesinger et al., supra note 181, at 253 (explaining that the difficulty in
prespecifying a task, such as mental health care, lessens the incentive to perform as
required, i.e., to produce more efficient care).
183. Pennsylvania “Kids for Cash” Conspiracy, IN PUB. INT., http://www.inthepublic
interest.org/case/pennsylvania-kids-cash-conspiracy (last visited Oct. 22, 2014).
184. Stephanie Chen, Pennsylvania Rocked by “Jailing Kids for Cash” Scandal, CNN
(Feb. 24, 2009, 10:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/23/
pennsylvania.corrupt.judges.
185. Id.
186. Mary Williams Walsh, J.P. Morgan Settles Alabama Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/business/05derivatives.html.
187. In part for this reason, sanctions are used infrequently and inconsistently.
188. It is unclear whether drafting less detailed contracts more effectively curbs
corruption. This is an area requiring more study.
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better contractor performance.189 For instance, one study was
conducted on a dataset of 450 local government contracts from
throughout the country obtained by a mail survey.190 It noted that
there is a common set of variables in the literature thought to
determine contract performance.191 Included in those variables are
contract specificity and contract monitoring scope and intensity,
among others.192 The study author hypothesized that these variables
would be positively correlated with the dependent variable.193 On the
contrary, though, the study found that “developing highly detailed
and specific contractual requirements [to] have little if any effect on
contracting performance,” and that “the discovery of performance
problems through monitoring by itself does little to improve
contracting performance.”194 It also found that the use of legal
Nor did
sanctions did not discourage poor performance.195
“including financial incentives . . . in the contractual agreement
appear[] to have . . . [an] effect on contracting performance . . . .”196
More work in this area is merited. But, at the very least, there is
strong reason to doubt that the default approach specifying tasks in
detail, monitoring to ensure compliance, and tying success to
financial incentives—is the best approach. The next Part details an
alternative suggested by work in behavioral economics.
III. SUGGESTING A DIFFERENT APPROACH
The standard approach to principal-agent problems is predicated
on the assumption of fully rational and selfish individuals looking for
opportunities to shirk.197 Viewed in this way, agents need to be
controlled or need to be given incentives so that their rational, profit189. Sergio Fernandez, Accounting for Performance in Contracting for Services:
Are Successful Contractual Relationships Controlled or Managed? 10–11 (Sept.
2005)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://localgov.fsu.edu/
readings_papers/Service%20Delivery/Fernandez_Accounting_for_Performance_in_C
ontracting_Services.doc.
190. Id. at 14–15.
191. Id. at 6.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 17–18.
195. Id. at 18.
196. Id. at 19; see also Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of
Incentives 1 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 507, 2002), available at
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/21434/1/dp507.pdf (finding that monetary
incentives can “backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance
with rules”). As discussed in Part III.B infra, other studies have affirmatively shown a
negative effect from the use of incentives.
197. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing how agency theory assumes that agents are
rational, selfish actors).
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maximizing interests align with the principal’s interests. But this is
not necessarily always an accurate view of individual behavior.
Indeed, it has now been over thirty years since Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky,198 Richard Thaler,199 and others first described a
variety of contract-relevant behavioral anomalies.
In particular, the positive reciprocity norm—meaning that people
reward kind actions—has been shown to often constrain actors’
behavior, resulting in deviations from what the rational actor model
would predict.200 Research has demonstrated that because of the
inclination towards reciprocity, less complete contracts that do not
highly specify tasks or do not use incentive-based compensation
actually induce higher agent effort levels and better constrain
opportunistic impulses than more explicit contracts.201 Therefore,
exclusive reliance on the rational actor model in designing contracts
to mitigate agency costs may be misplaced. This Part suggests that
particularly where traditional detailed contracts are ineffective,
governments should instead consider drafting contracts that trade on
the positive reciprocity value, and are accordingly less-detailed.202

198. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) (presenting problems in which
preferences violate the expected outcome); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981) (finding shifts
of preferences from the predicted outcome when the problem is framed in a
different way).
199. See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 57–58 (1980) (arguing that in certain situations consumers act in
a way inconsistent with economic theory).
200. See, e.g., Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 164, 176–
77. Not all actors will behave reciprocally. Fehr et al. have found that 60–75% of
subjects will behave reciprocally, while 15–25% of subjects will act in line with the
rational actor model. Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device, supra note
28, at 840 n.7.
201. See Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 173 (explaining
that with incomplete contracts, workers can punish the employer by working less
until the worker receives a wage increase).
202. But see, Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a
Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 732 n.17 (2006) (pointing out that
vertical integration is often the suggested solution when more complete contracting
is not possible). However, for a variety of reasons both economic and political,
governments often cannot practically take these services back “in-house.”
Governments may lack the resources and expertise to directly provide these services.
Once a service has been outsourced, there may be political consequences to
admitting the fault in that decision. Accordingly, this section looks for solutions
aside from vertical integration.
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A. The Reciprocity Norm in General
Reciprocity in the behavioral economics literature203 refers to
responding in kind. If you are treated kindly, you will respond with
kind actions. If you are treated poorly, you will reciprocate with
negative actions. Reciprocity is different from “cooperative” or
“retaliatory” behavior because it does not turn on a calculus as to
future benefits. As such, it is different from relational principals that
largely focus on the development of trust through long-term
interactions. The games that define the parameters of reciprocal
behavior are generally one-shot games with no repeat interaction.204 A
reciprocal actor reacts without expectation of future material gains.205
There are three seminal social dilemma games that are particularly
relevant to the theory of reciprocity: the Ultimatum Game, the Trust
Game, and the Public Goods Game.206 The Ultimatum Game
requires two participants to decide how to split a fixed sum of
money.207 The first party makes a proposal of how to split the sum,
and the second party either accepts the proposal or rejects it. If the
second party accepts the proposal, each leaves with their portion of
the total. If the second party rejects the proposal, both parties walk
away with nothing. If the parties acted in a purely rational, selfinterested manner, one would predict that the first party should
make a very low offer and the second party should accept it. The
second party is better off walking away with any amount that is not
zero. The evidence shows, however, that if the first party proposes
anything less than 20% of the total amount, the second party will
reject the offer more than 50% of the time.208 In other words, people
react to the perceived fairness of the offer, and not as the rational
actor model would predict.209

203. The term reciprocity is used across many different disciplines. Here, I am
focused on reciprocity in the behavioral sense as a form of voluntary cooperation.
204. Scott, supra note 28, at 1665. This is important for the application of
reciprocity to government service contracting where markets are often thin. While
trust that develops over time may certainly be important in this context, and many
contracts may indeed be long-term and involve repeat interaction, I am concerned
that repeat interaction games count on reputational sanctions in a well-functioning
market to constrain bad behavior.
205. Reciprocity is also different from altruism, which is unconditional kindness
unrelated to others’ actions.
206. Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us
About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 700 (2006).
207. Id. at 706–07.
208. Scott, supra note 28, at 1663.
209. See id. at 1664 (explaining that responders do not behave as the selfinterested hypothesis predicts because “[t]hey are prepared to reject offers they
perceive as unfair even at a cost to themselves”).
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The Trust Game is an extension of the classical Dictator Game.210
In the Trust Game, one player (the allocator) decides on his or her
own how to split up a pot of money with a second player.211 The
amount the allocator gives to the recipient is then multiplied by some
value greater than one and the recipient chooses what amount, if any,
to give back to the allocator. The game is played only once. A
rational allocator will assign no part of the pot to the recipient, and a
rational recipient will make no payment back to the allocator.212 A
2009 meta-analysis of 84 trust game studies revealed that the allocator
gave an average of about 51% and that the receiver returned an
average of 37%.213
Finally, in the Public Goods Game, each player is asked to secretly
contribute some amount of their money into a public pot.214 The
total amount of money is then multiplied by some “payoff” number
(i.e., a multiplier) and divided equally among the group. Subjects
are allowed to keep the money they do not contribute. Selfinterested, rational actors would contribute nothing to the pot
because they free ride off of others’ contributions regardless of
whether they individually contribute. In reality, though, people do
tend to contribute to the pot at some non-negligible percentage.
Studies confirm that three-quarters of participants will contribute and
that half of those who do so understand that they would be
economically better off not contributing.215
A host of empirical studies of real-world behavior have also
confirmed the functioning of the reciprocity value in practice. For
instance, the decisions to give to charity, to not litter, and to wait your
turn in line have all been studied as examples of reciprocity in
action.216 In other words, people reciprocate the dispositions of
210. Id. at 1663 n.95; see Schultz, supra note 206, at 708 (explaining that, in the
Dictator Game, the proposer decides how much money to give to an anonymous
person, who receives the money and cannot respond).
211. Noel D. Johnson & Alexandra Mislin, Cultures of Kindness: A Meta-Analysis of
Trust Game Experiments 4 (May 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Cultures-of-Kindness---A-Meta-Analysis-ofTrust-Game-Experiments-.pdf.
212. See Scott, supra note 28, at 1661 (defining rational choice theory as a theory
that assumes individuals will make decisions based on self-interest).
213. Johnson & Mislin, supra note 211, at 10–11, 40 tbl.1.
214. Schultz, supra note 206, at 702–03.
215. Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful Backlash: Social Repercussions for the
Increased Use of Alternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 204 (2005). In
a 2001 study, Fischbacher et al., observed average contributions of 33.5%. Urs
Fischbacher et al., Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods
Experiment, 71 ECON. LETTERS 397, 401 (2001).
216. See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 29 (7th ed. 1995) (discussing how
people tend to do what they see others doing and comply with social norms, for
instance in not littering); ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 96–
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others; they engage in certain behavior because others are also
willing to do so, and it seems fair to comply with behavioral norms.
The games and their real-world counterparts demonstrate
reciprocal social behavior that deviates from rational actor
expectations. The games focus on how behavior is affected in light of
the perceived intentions of other actors. If another actor treats you
fairly, you are more likely to treat him or her fairly in return. The
actual fairness of distribution is not as relevant as the perceived
kindness or fairness of actions.217
The identification of the reciprocity norm may suggest that
contracting mechanisms relying purely on material self-interest are
incomplete because they are missing important behavioral
motivations. The next Section explores whether contract design has
the potential to prompt reciprocal behavior.
B. Reciprocity and Specificity in Contracting
Reciprocity is now firmly established in experimental settings and
can be reliably elicited.218 The next question, then, is how the
reciprocity norm manifests in the contracting context (if at all).
As discussed in Part II.E, one might predict that a less specified
contract that does not tie performance to compensation would make
it more difficult for a principal to control an agent. If contracts are
not well specified, then rational, self-interested parties might take
advantage of ambiguities in the contract and shirk. In addition, the
traditional view of specificity in contract design is that specificity is an
enabling factor for monitoring. The agent cannot be successful in
implementing the will of the principal unless it knows precisely what
the principal wants it to do. It is generally thought that specifying

97 (3d ed. 1993) (explaining that people have a tendency to give more to charity if
they think others also give to charity); Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of
Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015–16 (1990); Stanley Milgram et al., Response
to Intrusion into Waiting Lines, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 683, 683 (1986)
(analyzing the line as an example of society’s effort to create equity); Peter H.
Reingen, Test of a List Procedure for Inducing Compliance with a Request to Donate Money,
67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 110, 110 (1982) (discussing the impact of social influence on
people contributing to charity).
217. Stefan Magen, Fairness and Reciprocity in Contract Governance 5 (Max Planck
Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Preprint, Working paper No. 2013/21, 2013),
available at https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/84986/1/769720838.pdf.
218. Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 162–63; see also
Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1091 n.245 (2009) (“The observed preference for
reciprocity is heterogeneous . . . ‘where some people exhibit reciprocal behavior
and others are selfish.’”).
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tasks ex ante is less costly than litigating a vague contract ex post, taking
into consideration the probability that litigation will result.219
This is all what traditional law and economics suggests. But,
experiments tying the reciprocity norm to contracting behavior belie
much of this traditional view.220 Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter,
among others, have studied the question of whether changing
contract design can cultivate social norms, in particular reciprocal
responses, and have answered in the affirmative.221
In one study, Fehr et al. hypothesized that “reciprocal motivations
and interactions could potentially ease incentive compatibility
constraints” in contracts.222
They tested their theory in an
experiment that simulated firms and workers.223 They designed two
treatments, a weak reciprocity treatment and a strong reciprocity
treatment.224
In the weak treatment, workers could respond
reciprocally to firms’ actions, but the firms could not respond to the
workers.225 On the other hand, in the strong treatment, both the firm
and the workers could respond reciprocally to each other.226 The
study found large efficiency gains in the strong reciprocity
treatment.227 Workers shirked less, and firms enforced effort levels
far above the incentive compatible level.228
In another study, Fehr and Gächter tested how explicit material
incentives to abide by the terms of the contract interact with
motivations of fairness and reciprocity.229 There, the study compared
implicit and explicit contracts.230 The implicit contract specified a
fixed wage and a desired effort level, but made no incentive-based

219. See Magen, supra note 217, at 15–16 (discussing the efficiencies of ex ante
and ex post negotiations).
220. See id. at 14 (“With homo reciprocans contracting, contracts will be
accompanied by expectations of fairness. These fairness expectations might not be
recognised by the law as relevant, but it is safe to assume that they influence the
formation and execution of the contract by the parties and should hence be taken
into account by Contract Governance.” (footnote omitted)).
221. In more recent years, others have also studied whether contract choices “may
signal information about the actions of other agents and thus create indirect effects
on behavior.” Anastasia Danilov & Dirk Sliwka, Can Contracts Signal Social Norms?
Experimental Evidence 3 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 7477,
2013) (citing the economic models generated by Sliwka (2007), Friebel and
Schnedler (2011), van der Weele (2012), and Bénabou and Tirole (2012)).
222. Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device, supra note 28, at 834.
223. Id. at 835.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 835, 856.
228. Id. at 856.
229. Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 176.
230. Id. at 176–78.
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commitments.231 The principal was obligated to pay the wage
regardless of the agent’s actual output level.232 The explicit contract
also specified a wage and a desired output; however, it included an
additional term whereby the principal could fine the agent in the
case of shirking.233 The game had three stages.234 Principals chose
contracts (explicit or implicit), agents agreed to contracts, and then
agents chose an effort level.235
The results were informative. Principals who chose the explicit
contract lost on average nine tokens per contract, compared to a
profit of 26 tokens per implicit contract.236 The difference was
attributable to effort levels.237 The agent’s effort level in the implicit
contract was 5.2 on average (out of ten), while the effort level in the
explicit contract was 2.1 on average.238 Similar results have been
confirmed by other studies.239
Why would it be the case that less explicit contracts prompt better
agent performance? Most experiments do little to answer this
question.240 The prevailing theory is that less-specific contracts give
231. Although it made no commitment to do so, the principal had the option of
paying a bonus after observing the agent’s effort level. Id. at 176.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 176–77.
236. Id. at 177.
237. Id.
238. Fehr & Gächter dismiss the possibility that the punishment versus reward
distinction explains the result based on the results of further experiments. Id. at 177.
239. See, e.g., Bohnet et al., supra note 24, at 141 (asserting that lower levels of
contract enforcement increase trustworthiness between contracting parties while
economic incentives do not have the same effect); Fehr & Gächter, Crowd Out, supra
note 33, at 26 (observing that voluntary cooperation may be crowded out by
incentive contracts); Frey & Jegen, supra note 33, at 606 (finding empirical evidence
for the idea that incentives and punishments crowd out intrinsic motivation); Kessler
& Leider, supra note 33, at 76 (describing a laboratory experiment finding
unenforceable “handshake” agreements to be most effective); Lubell & Scholz, supra
note 33, at 167 (discovering that incentives created by institutions do not
“counterbalance the temptation to free ride”); see also Scott, supra note 28, at 1644–
45 (speculating that parties write “deliberately incomplete contracts that rely on selfenforcement” between strangers, which is a “more efficient . . . alternative . . . [than]
more complete, legally enforceable agreements”). But cf. Rigdon, supra note 33, at
102–03 (finding no evidence to support a hypothesis that motivating a worker with
trust alone is more effective than incentives or punishments). Put simply, these
studies suggest that less specified contracts may prompt better performance than
more explicit contracts that utilize incentive-based compensation even though
higher effort levels are not in the agent’s rational self-interest. Scott, supra note 28,
at 1663 (“[E]xperimental evidence suggests that incompletely specified contracts
that leave space for reciprocation can achieve higher levels of efficiency than more
explicit, legally enforceable contracts. These fairness values appear to interact with
and complement the self-interest motivation of economic actors.”).
240. Behavioral economics tries to predict responses but does not in general seek
to answer the question of “why.”
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agents more autonomy than more-specific ones and boost intrinsic
motivation.241 Specificity in contracts, on the other hand, gives the
agent the impression of lack of trust on the part of the principal.
This theory is strengthened by other work.242 For instance, an
experiment allowed a principal to either set a lower limit for
production to bind an agent, or to give discretion to an agent to set a
production amount.243 It then tested production amounts chosen by
agents.244 The results indicated higher levels of production with the
ambiguous instruction than with the lower limit.245 When the agents
were questioned, most indicated perceiving the lower limit as a signal
of distrust and hence behaved less cooperatively.246
One possibility is that less-specific contracts frame the relationship
from the outset as a cooperative one. The so-called “Wall Street
Game” or “Community Game,” demonstrated that simply changing
the name of the social dilemma game significantly changed the
results.247 In this experiment, American college students, Israeli
pilots, and their flying instructors played a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type
game where the participants chose to compete or cooperate in a
number of stages.248 Those who were told they were playing “the
Community Game” were found to be much more cooperative
throughout the stages of the game than those who were told they
were playing “the Wall Street Game.”249 Similarly, the tone set during
contracting may persist for the duration of the parties’ relationship.

241. Chou et al., supra note 24, at 17–18 (asserting that less-specific contracts
benefit both employees and employers); see also Edward L. Deci et al., Facilitating
Internalization: The Self-Determination Theory Perspective, 62 J. PERSONALITY 119, 140
(1994) (extolling the benefits of self-determination:
enhanced creativity,
productivity, and work satisfaction); Wendy S. Grolnick & Richard M. Ryan, Parent
Styles Associated with Children’s Self-Regulation and Competence in School, 81 J. EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 143, 152 (1989) (finding that children are more successful when parents
support the child’s autonomy); Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination
Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55
AM. PSYCHOL. 68, 76 (2000) (explaining that autonomy encourages intrinsic
motivation, while controlled conditions undermine it).
242. Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
1611 (2006).
243. Id. at 1611.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1612.
246. Id. at 1611–12.
247. Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1175, 1182 (2004).
248. Id. at 1176, 1178.
249. Id. at 1177 (finding that when playing the “Community Game,” more
nominees cooperated, while when playing the “Wall Street Game,” only one-third of
the same nominees cooperated).
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Less specified contracts set a more positive tone than more highly
detailed, control-based contracts.250
Other studies have shown that strict enforcement, incentives, and
sanctions can also harm cooperation.251 In general, much work has
now suggested that intrinsic motivations can be crowded out by
extrinsic ones.252 Fehr in particular has found that when people
attribute their behavior to external rewards, they discount their other
(social) incentives for behavior.253
It is not only specificity that can crowd out intrinsic motivation.
Studies have shown that the use of tangible rewards or sanctions
undermines motivation for a range of activities.254 Use of incentives,
such as incentive-based compensation (the so-called carrots and
sticks), can damage self-esteem and harm the norms of
professionalism, thus crowding out intrinsic motivation.255 Also,
monitoring at a certain level decreases work effort.256 Monitoring and
specificity together have been shown to be particularly problematic.257
250. See David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1796–97 (2007) (noting
in the context of firm behavior that “negative attitudes toward cooperative behavior
are always lurking in the background and must be proactively managed”).
251. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision
Frames, and Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 704 (1999) (suggesting that
sanctioning systems decrease cooperation and cause subjects to value economic
incentives over moral ones).
252. Bohnet et al., supra note 24, at 132 (“At intermediate levels [of
enforcement], honesty is crowded out; more second movers breach, and resources
are wasted in trials.”); Deci et al., Extrinsic Rewards, supra note 24, at 659 (“[R]eward
contingencies undermine people’s taking responsibility for motivating or regulating
themselves.”); Fehr & Gächter, Crowd Out, supra note 33, at 26 (describing their
finding “that reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation may indeed be crowded out by
incentive contracts”); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 3 (2000) (arguing that “the introduction of the fine changes the perception
of people regarding the environment in which they operate,” but does not
necessarily reduce penalized behavior); Daniel Houser et al., When Punishment Fails:
Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non-Cooperation, 62 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 509,
522 (2008) (“Credible threats of sanctions often failed to produce cooperative
behavior, and our evidence is that incentives, not intentions, underlie this effect.”);
Chou et al., supra note 24, at 16.
253. See, e.g., Fehr & Gächter, Crowd Out, supra note 33, at 26 (concluding that
“reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation” has been crowded out by incentive
contracts); see also John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, CALIF.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 32) (on file with author) (citing the work
of Tom Tyler to show that law enforcement officers’ perceptions of legitimacy are
shaped by their feelings about procedural fairness).
254. See generally EDWARD DECI & RICHARD RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELFDETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1985) (describing how psychological needs,
specifically self-determination and competence, drive human motivation).
255. See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 30, at 1400 (finding that paradoxically,
introduction of formal enforcement increases shirking).
256. See David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, Does Monitoring Decrease Work
Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories, 63 GAMES &
ECON. BEHAV. 56, 70 (2008) (finding that productivity is reduced when subjects are
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Evidence on crowding out, however, is far from conclusive or
without controversy.258 Some scholars have deemed it “thin.”259 The
body of work is growing, but should nonetheless continue to be
studied and confirmed.
C. Support from Other Contexts
While it may seem counter-intuitive that less is more in terms of
motivating agents, there are interesting real-world examples of
companies very successfully motivating their employees through lessspecific direction.260 For instance, Zappos grew a million-dollar
business built on customer service without telling its call center
employees what to say—an unheard of approach in the industry.261
The approach resulted in a corporate culture that considered the
highest level of customer service crucial to the company’s business
model.262 This focus on customer service seems to have worked.
Nordstrom, one of the most profitable retailers in the United States,
took a similar approach for many years. Their employment contract
simply stated: “Use best judgment in all situations. There will be no
additional rules.”263 In general, old models of motivation driven by

more heavily monitored); see also Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Motivation
Governance, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: INTEGRATING ECONOMIC AND
ORGANIZATION THEORY 26, 28 (Anna Grandori ed., 2013) (arguing that monetary
incentives can negatively impact performance and reduce the joy a person feels from
completing a task).
257. “According to these theories, over time, the accuracy of measurement
decreases as people concentrate their effort strictly on the measured components of
an activity, resulting in a decline in the overall quality of their performance.
Therefore, specificity combined with monitoring that focuses only on given
measurable components (the letter of the law) seems to produce a straightforward
effect of crowding out intrinsic motivation and decreasing overall performance.”
Constantine Boussalis et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Effect of Specificity on
Compliance and Performance 7 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
258. Several studies do not find crowding out but rather see complementarity,
including Sergio G. Lazzarini et al., Order with Some Law: Complementarity Versus
Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 261, 290 (2004),
and Rigdon, supra note 33, at 93, 102.
259. Eric A. Posner, Book Note, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 509, 510 n.1 (2007) (reviewing
ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006), and criticizing the limited
availability of cognitive psychology evidence for crowding-out theory); see also Yuval
Feldman, The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations:
Theoretical and Empirical Insights from the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 11, 23 (2011) (observing that alternative paradigms using different theoretical
structures can produce similar results to those produced by the crowding-out theory).
260. DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US
103 (2009).
261. Id. at 103.
262. Id.
263. Chou et al., supra note 24, at 2.
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carrots and sticks are passé. Human motivation is largely intrinsic,
and that impulse should be fostered.264
The regulatory context provides additional real world support for
the proposition that less specificity prompts higher levels of effort
and innovation. John Braithwaite famously studied nursing home
regulations in Australia.265 He found that a standards-based regime
resulted in higher quality service than a strict rules-based regime.266
For instance, when nursing homes were told how many pieces of
artwork to hang on the wall, they tore pages out of magazines and
taped them to wall, complying with the letter of the requirement but
certainly not its spirit.267 On the other hand, when nursing homes
were told to create a home-like environment, they did a much better
job complying with the spirit of the regulation.268
A comparative study of the greening of the car industry in Japan
and the United States is also instructive.269 Japan used a more
standards-based approach, whereas the United States highly detailed
its regulations.270 A study determined that the United States’
Results were
formalism undermined affirmative motivations.271
significantly better under the Japanese approach.272 In general, the
regulatory sphere has seen a move away from the traditional,
formalist, command-and-control type regulation in the past decade.273
The concept of providing less specification in privatization
contracts is similar. Privatization is designed to foster innovation, but
contracting through detailed specification, monitoring, and
incentive-based compensation crowds out the intrinsic motivation

264. PINK, supra note 260, at 9.
265. John Braithwaite, supra note 34, at 61.
266. See, e.g., id. at 75; John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism:
Rules Versus Standards in Nursing-Home Regulation, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 307, 336
(1995); Marilyn J. Rantz et al., Field Testing, Refinement, and Psychometric Evaluation of a
New Measure of Nursing Home Care Quality, 14 J. NURSING MEASUREMENT 129, 144 (2006).
267. Braithwaite, supra note 34, at 61.
268. Id.
269. MIKLER, supra note 34, at 2.
270. Id. at 98, 101.
271. Id. at 101.
272. Id.; see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 461
(2006) (arguing that regulation of private firms should be more principal based and
the specifics of how to achieve them should be delegated to the agent, especially for
complex regulations).
273. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 265, 299–301 (2013) (noting the “[w]aning [a]ppeal of [c]ommand
and [c]ontrol [r]egulation”).
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required for innovation.274
Accordingly, governments should
reconsider what has become the default approach.
D. The Proposal: Less-Specified Contracts
The proposal this Article advances is a nuanced one. Where
mitigating agency cost through detailed contracts is unlikely to be
effective for the reasons detailed in Part II, governments should try a
less-specified contract design without use of incentive-based
compensation.
Contracting parties are sensitive to intentions
conveyed by contract language.
This Article suggests that
governments might be better served by conveying positive intentions
to the other party to a bilateral agreement—as in the Community
Game/Wall Street Game experiments, framing the relationship as
one based on collaboration rather than competition. I focus on this
particular problem in the government outsourcing context because it
is an area of pressing need where current solutions are clearly not
working. But I leave open for another day the possibility that this
proposal might have broader application.
There is a spectrum along which contracts might specify tasks. At
one end, one could conceive of a contract that tries to detail every
step, no matter how small, that an employee must take in processing
an application for Medicaid benefits. At the other end, one might
imagine a contract that simply says “process applications for benefits.”
This Article merely assumes that government service contracts are
closer to the detailed pole than they should be. But it does not
suggest that contracts be drafted that are entirely devoid of guidance
for the contractors. Indeed, studies have found that when faced with
ambiguity and the absence of goals, ambiguity will be used to justify
moral hazard behavior.275 Subjects given distal and proximal goals do
better than those simply instructed to “‘do [their] best.’”276
To invoke the reciprocity norm, contracts should specify goals, but
also create room for contractor discretion and innovation.277 Based
274. See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV.
ECON. STUD. 489, 503 (2003) (finding that explicit incentive schemes can backfire,
reducing motivation in the long term); see also Rappaport, supra note 253, at 32
(discussing studies of police officers and concluding that officers who are treated
fairly are motivated to be good organizational citizens).
275. See Jason Dana et al., Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room: Experiments Demonstrating
an Illusory Preference for Fairness, 33 ECON. THEORY 67, 78 (2007) (finding that reduced
transparency encouraged study participants to act in in their self-interest).
276. Gary P. Latham & Gerard H. Seijts, The Effects of Proximal and Distal Goals on
Performance on a Moderately Complex Task, 20 J. ORG. BEHAV. 421, 426 (1999).
277. See id. (finding superior performance when goals combine with feelings of
self-efficacy).
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on study results, contractors are likely to react positively to the trust
put in them to deliver quality service and to ascertain the best
method of delivering that service and accomplishing the defined
goal.278 This type of contracting device might reduce the possibility
of opportunistic behavior by the agent rather than encouraging
opportunism through vagueness.
In the welfare benefits example, a less-detailed contract would
establish price and contract duration.279 But, instead of specifying
tasks, outcome measures, and incentives, it would set only broader
parameters and goals to guide the relationship. It would function
essentially like a simple employment agreement, which sets
compensation and defines the parameters of a role, but generally
does not impose sanctions tied to specific tasks. Similarly, a less
detailed public-private contract would not specify particular tasks and
exacting success metrics ex ante. Rather, it would be more fluid,
allowing the parties to chart the best, most flexible course during the
term of the contract.280
E. Possible Limitations and Future Study
Despite the promise inherent in this new approach, it is difficult to
argue that reciprocity norm experiments have any direct application
to public-private contracting. This Section flags some limitations in
the approach and suggests areas where future study would bolster the
preliminary conclusions of this Article.
The most common critique of reciprocity is that it is a figment of
lab work that does not translate to the real world.281 Actors in
experiments might behave differently than they would in real work
environments. For instance, they might behave in a manner that they
believe will please the experimenter. The stakes may be artificially
278. Chou et al., supra note 24, at 3 (defining “less-specific contracts” as those that
describe basic roles and rules and “more-specific contracts” as those that describe
roles, rules, and contingencies in more elaborate detail).
279. Note that the contracts would still have to have the necessary requirements
to be enforced by a court. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 28, at 1643 (discussing a category
of contracts that are so incomplete that courts refuse to enforce them pursuant to
traditional contracts doctrine). It may be more difficult to prove breach based on a
low quality service provision absent explicit performance requirements.
280. See Macneil, supra note 36, at 900 (advocating for planned flexibility in
complicated contractual relationships, because these relationships will become
dysfunctional if too tightly controlled).
281. See, e.g., Francesco Guala, Reciprocity: Weak or Strong? What Punishment
Experiments Do (and Do Not) Demonstrate, 35 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 1 (2012) (using
reciprocity theory to explain the willingness of experimental subjects to punish
uncooperative free-riders at personal cost); Scott, supra note 28, at 1672 (noting that
reciprocity theory has not yet been tested seriously in real world contexts, though it is
predictive in experimental settings).
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low, leading to distortions in behavior. On the other hand, they may
be asked to put themselves in situations that are foreign and for
which they have no expertise.
Experimenters have tried to address some of these critiques by
increasing the stakes in experiments and by using a diversity of test
subjects, not just university students.282 Results in other studies are
similar. The possibility of trying to please the experimenter may
indeed cause distortions, but the critique carries less weight against
the backdrop of heterogeneous results where decision subjects make
different choices.283 It is true that lab results must be taken with a grain
of salt. The real world case studies and regulatory context referenced
above are helpful, but certainly the conclusions in this Article could be
bolstered by additional work evaluating real world responses to lessdetailed contracts, particularly in the government setting.
Another concern is that the studies of reciprocity in contracting
generally test an employment relationship, where a single individual
must decide how to react to contract language. In the context of
government service contracting, the government contracts with a
large private firm. It is difficult to know the extent to which a juniorlevel employee conducting work pursuant to the contract knows what
the language of the contract requires, or can be influenced by contract
language choices. Put more generally, the transferability of these results
to firm-level behavior is somewhat attenuated.284 For incomplete
contracts to have the desired effect, the reciprocity inclinations of firm
leadership would have to be displayed by firm workers.
There is reason to be optimistic, however, that the results are
relevant to firm-firm interactions. Even in firm-firm contracting,
performance decisions are ultimately made by individuals. For
instance, one can look to the example of prisons making the decision
to cut security or welfare administrators giving direction to cream
applications. In both cases, senior executives made the decisions and
set the tone for those beneath them in the hierarchy. Senior
executives are individuals making decisions capable of being
282. See Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 161–62
(providing examples of studies that found that higher monetary stakes either did not
change the results or led to only minor impacts in negative reciprocity ultimatum
games); Liberman at al., supra note 247, at 1182.
283. See Scott, supra note 28, at 1648 (discussing the real-world challenges that
economic actors confront, and noting that these externalities may influence
contracting behavior).
284. See Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 162–63
(concluding that while experiments have shown that reciprocity is a common
behavioral response for some people in certain circumstances, the extent to which it
impacts individual interactions in firms, government, and markets is unclear).

EPSTEIN.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

48

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

12/9/2014 2:43 PM

[Vol. 64:1

influenced by contract language just as the individuals in the
experimental literature.285 In the USIS example, executive leadership
allegedly passed down the order to flush applications.286 It is easy to
imagine that executive level leadership, in that case influenced by
contractual provisions linking pay to completed background checks,
could be influenced by changing the contract structure. If USIS
leadership took a different approach, that approach would influence
more junior level employees.287
Another concern is that these studies do not truly test how clarity
of objective (i.e. specifying tasks rather than simply broad standards)
plays into performance quality.288 One reason that scholars advocate
for task specification is that clarity is thought to mitigate conflict.289
Agents with a clear sense of purpose are thought to better meet their
objectives.
Contractors given unconstrained discretion might
innovate and deliver quality service, or they might jump at the “hole”
in task definition and act opportunistically.290
Contract
incompleteness in some literature has been equated with a risk of
increased litigation for precisely these reasons.291
285. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation:
Vertical
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 487 n.144 (2009)
(explaining that while the experiments cited describe individual behavior and not
the behavior of firms, the findings should be relevant to those institutions because
the individuals in the simulated collaborative process are personally invested in the
success of the project); see also Van Slyke, Agents or Stewards, supra note 51, at 164
(defining stewardship theory as situations in which managers act as “stewards” who
put the objectives of their principles before their own individual goals).
286. See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text.
287. A recent study looked at a related issue, evaluating the extent to which an
individual breaching a contract is seen as having committed a moral transgression,
whereas a firm breaching is viewed as having made a legitimate business decision.
Uriel Haran, A Person—Organization Discontinuity in Contract Perception:
Why
Corporations Can Get Away with Breaking Contracts But Individuals Cannot, 59 MGMT. SCI.
2837, 2839, 2844, 2851 (2013). The study found that “some actions are equally
regarded as moral transgressions when committed by either individuals or
organizations.” Id. at 2844. As such, “the formation of an explicit association
between the contract and a promise—accomplished by phrasing organizational
contractual obligations in promise terms—can eliminate the discrepancies between
people’s reactions to contract breaches by organizations versus those by individuals.”
Id. at 2839. The study looks at perception of behavior rather than impact on actual
behavior, but the results suggest phrasing contracts in terms of promise may affect
results. Id. at 2851.
288. Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 30, at 1390.
289. Id. at 1391 (addressing the choices that parties must make regarding
renegotiation of contractual rights when formal contract enforcement breaks down);
see also Boussalis et al., supra note 257, at 6–7 (suggesting “that when specificity helps
provide clear instructions . . . it is superior to ambiguous standards or instructions”).
290. Work has shown, for instance, that parties are more likely to act
opportunistically when they can rationalize that the contract was ambiguous.
Boussalis et al., supra note 257, at 6–7.
291. See Scott, supra note 28, at 1643 (analyzing a sample of incomplete contracts
and noting “a surprisingly high volume of litigation”).
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Although this criticism is valid because the reciprocity studies do
not address the role of task specification in performance, they do
demonstrate that agents who could have acted opportunistically by
exerting minimal levels of effort did not so. In theory, if agents are
satisfied with the contracting relationship and the discretion to meet
high-level objectives, they may ultimately perform better and perhaps
innovate to save costs rather than decrease quality of service. These
issues require further testing.
A related issue has to do with monitoring. Monitoring is
dependent, so the argument goes, on knowing what the monitors are
looking for (i.e. task specification). The idea, however, is that
monitoring will be less necessary because the agent will be
intrinsically motivated.292 Also, monitoring may be more successful
without strict and detailed contract language because it will be more
collaborative and cooperative in nature. The idea that monitoring is
more successful with an underlying detailed contract is a fallacy, as
discussed above.
Another argument for specification over reciprocity is that
specification is beneficial if litigation does result. It would be both
more costly and more difficult to litigate a breach of contract action
where the contract is less specific. Also, it may be hard to imagine a
lawyer who, anticipating potential litigation ex post, would counsel a
client to make his or contract less detailed.
These, too, are valid concerns, although at base, they harken back
to the basic standards versus rules debate. Courts are frequently
tasked with adjudicating standards. It might be more costly to
adjudicate a contract that is more standard-like than rule-like,293 but
that tradeoff might be worthwhile in a cost-benefit analysis if a more
standard-like contract is also less likely to result in litigation because
the principal will be happier with the agent’s effort level compared to
a rule-like regime.294 Also important to consider is that less-detailed
contracts are less costly to draft ex ante.
As mentioned earlier, there are additional reasons that parties
might prefer specificity. For instance, politicians might prefer more
292. See Rappaport, supra note 253, at 32 (observing that “voluntary deference
yields good behavior even when officers know they are not being watched”).
293. However, there are lots of shades of grey in this question. In cases where
contracts seem to be detailed and clear, the modern approach is to nonetheless allow
parties to introduce extrinsic evidence.
294. See, e.g., George Triantis, Exploring the Limits of Contract Design in Debt
Financing, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2041, 2045–46 (2013) (arguing that standards like good
faith that convey discretion to the court can be effective tools if the reason for
contract incompleteness is cost of specification ex ante but this introduces the risk of
high cost litigation and judicial error).
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detailed contracts for reasons of public accountability or to have
benchmarks to prove success. These mechanisms are only effective
though if the public is attuned to these contracts and if benchmarks
are easy to discern, which is often not the case.
Contractors too might want more detailed contracts so that they
have better information on which to base their bids. Without a
detailed contract, some might worry about preventing corruption295
or a race to the bottom based on price.
The problem, again, is that detailed contracts have not proven to
be particularly effective at mitigating these concerns. This is
particularly true where there is a thin market for services. Many of
the examples cited in this paper are ones where there was only one
bidder for the work.
Reciprocity-based contracting may not solve every problem
inherent in government contracting. But it holds much promise and
the government should experiment with this new method.
CONCLUSION
Contracts for complex government services only continue to grow
in use. That such contracts often result in cost reduction at the
sacrifice of service quality is a dire problem, particularly when
governments are outsourcing services such as national security,
prison and public benefits administration, and education.
Private service providers engage in opportunistic behavior that
reduces service quality because of misaligned incentives and
unconstrained agency costs. The private service provider is interested
in maximizing profit while the government is interested in the agent
providing quality service. Agency theory suggests that the way to
mitigate such costs is to align incentives. The traditional method for
aligning incentives in similar scenarios is to detail tasks, monitor to
ensure compliance, and reward (or punish) compliance with
financial incentives.
However, the traditional method is ill-suited to mitigate agency
costs for certain types of contracts for government service. For many
of these contracts, it is difficult and costly both to specify tasks and to
monitor performance. A thin market also cuts against use of the
traditional method, as does the prevalence of corruption.
This Article suggested that the traditional approach is based on an
assumption that agents are rational actors looking for opportunities
to shirk and this may be a misunderstanding of human nature.
295.

Corruption is a problem that neither model adequately solves.
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Governments should instead look to research on the reciprocity
norm in contracting and draft less-detailed contracts. At the very
least, we should consider a solution that fosters the collaborative
rather than the competitive instincts of private service providers.
Studies have shown that less-detailed contracts where agents are left
more discretion and more room to innovate generate better agent
performance than more detailed contracts. The studies are not
without limitation, but contracting parties would be remiss to continue
to function as if increasing contract specification is the clear choice.

